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GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
A GENERAL THEORY OF
STATE-COURT JURISDICTION
Pennoyer v. Neff' is, to borrow a phrase from Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, not merely a venerable case. It represents a particular way of
looking at the law of jurisdiction.2 Its rules of jurisdiction have been
gradually abandoned in detail, though in certain respects they still
represent accepted law. But the conceptual structure established by
Pennoyer remains substantially intact. The questions of state-court
jurisdiction continue to be formulated much as Justice Field formu-
lated them: may the state exercise "power" or "authority" (as if
these were indistinguishable notions) over the particular person,
thing, or intangible in question (as if these were separable notions)?
Pennoyer's conceptual endurance is not easily explained: the de-
flection of critical energies toward the kindred topic of conflicts of
law, the accidental sequence in which the problems of jurisdiction
came to the Supreme Court in the years after Pennoyer, the pallia-
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., is Professor of Law, The University of Chicago, and
Administrator, American Bar Foundation.
In memoriam.-Like all laborers in this particular vineyard of the law, I have suf-
fered special loss in the premature death of Brainerd Currie. The debt of each of us
to him can be paid only by seeking to attain the high standards set by his example.
I can only hope that this article comes close.
195 U.S. 714 (1877).
2 In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945), Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said: "In overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, Eric R. Co. v. Tompkins did not
merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a particular way of looking at law
which dominated the judicial process long after its inadequacies had been laid
bare."
HeinOnline -- 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241 1965
242 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
don of Pennoyer's worst defects by improvisation, all played a part.
But most important is the fact that the inertia of the Pennoyer sys-
tem has never been challenged by the appearance of an acceptable
alternative.3
The principal components of a jurisdictional theory strong
enough to displace Pennoyer are to be found in the "minimum con-
tacts" approach of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.4 But no
such theory has yet been constructed out of those components. The
reasons why International Shoe has not been thus developed seem to
be three. First, the minimum-contacts approach was itself associated
only with in personam jurisdiction and had no apparent relevance to
jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem. A general theory such as
Pennoyer's is not displaced by one of merely special application.
Second, there seemed to be no satisfactory method of establishing
limits on state-court jurisdiction if the minimum-contacts approach
were applied generally. Limits were felt difficult enough to devise in
the application of minimum-contacts analysis to in personam cases,6
and that could be regarded as justification not to borrow trouble by
extension of the analysis to other types of cases. The vagaries of
property situs that had emerged in the state taxation cases also
warned against introducing similarly unpredictable flexibility into
the rules of jurisdiction in rem."
3 Cf. Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead, Long Live Pennoyer, 30 Rocn= MTN. L.
REv. 285 (1958).
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In that case Mr. Chief Justice Stone had said: "Histori-
cally the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on
their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment
personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff.... But now that the capias ad respon-
dendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice,
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "Id. at 316.
6 Justice (now Chief Justice) Traynor suggested the general application of the
minimum-contacts theory in his opinion in Atidnson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d
338, 345 (1957), where he said that the jurisdictional question in a case involving
claims to a res should be determined by "the general principles governing jurisdic-
tion over persons and property rather than in an attempt to assigning a fictional
sius to intangibles."
6 See, e.g., Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250 (1959).
7 See, e.g., State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Riley v.
New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
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A third reason why Pennoyer has not yet been abandoned is that
only recently has its theoretical confusion deepened enough to make
its abandonment a more attractive possibility than trying to live
with it. To abandon a theoretical construct is to unsettle habits of
mind, to deplete stores of knowledge, and perhaps to invite unfore-
seeable difficulties. A system of legal concepts, however inelegant,
can easily persist beyond the point when it produces or invites bad
results-these can be avoided by decisional manipulation. But when
a conceptual system has become so involved that understanding it is
more difficult than deciding how to apply it to particular cases,
searching for new concepts is as attractive as attempting to retain
the old.8 Pennoyer v. Neff would seem to have reached that stage a
few years ago in Hanson v. Denckla.0 It is not easy to state what
Hanson was about, but an attempt is required.
A Mrs. Donner while living in Pennsylvania established an inter
vivos trust under the administration of a Delaware trust company,
naming herself as life beneficiary and her estate the beneficiary upon
her death, subject to a retained power of appointment. She then
moved to Florida. Thereafter, she simultaneously made a will giving
to two of her daughters the bulk of the property she still owned out-
right and endeavored to execute a power of appointment making
the children of her third daughter the beneficiaries of the trust upon
her death. (This would have divided her entire property about
evenly among her daughters and their children per stirpes.) She died
in Florida, her estate being probated there by the third daughter,
whom she had named as her executrix.
A dispute arose in which the two daughters contended that the
power of appointment was invalid so that the trust corpus passed to
the decedent's estate and thus under the will to them. Litigation was
commenced in Florida by the two daughters, and in Delaware by
the daughter who was executrix. The Florida courts assumed juris-
diction on the alternative theories that the dispute concerned a res
consisting of the decedent's estate, or an in personam controversy in
which the executrix was personally served, and decided in favor of
the two daughters. The Delaware courts assumed jurisdiction on the
theory that the dispute concerned a res consisting of the trust
corpus, and decided in favor of the executrix daughter.
8 Cf. Ynterna, The Historical Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Co v.
LAW 297, 304 (1953); KumN, THE STRucrtuE oF ScINmTFic REVOLUTIONS (1963).
9 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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In a 5 to 4 decision, Mr. Chief Justice Warren reached the fair
result, in favor of the executrix daughter, but by a line of analysis
that in all charity and after mature reflection is impossible to follow,
no less to relate. The Court held that Florida had neither jurisdiction
in rem over the trust nor jurisdiction in personam over the trustee;
that Delaware had jurisdiction because the trust corpus was within
its territory. The difficulties in the opinion include at least the
following: (1) Why was the dispute about the trust corpus, rather
than the decedent's estate? The question was whether certain stock
should be assigned to the trust corpus or to the decedent's estate; to
assume it was a trust case was to assume the question in issue. (2)
Why were not the "contacts" of the Delaware trustee-who had
maintained an extended correspondence with the decedent-with
Florida enough to satisfy the minimum required by International
Shoe to establish in personam jurisdiction? The Court said that the
trustee had not "performed any acts in Florida" but in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co.,'0 a mail order insurance business
had been held subject to jurisdiction in the state of residence of a
policy beneficiary. (3) Why was it not sufficient that the Florida
court had before it all those beneficially interested in the property,
whether or not the Delaware trustee was also subject to jurisdiction?
These are not difficulties of decisional technique. They are in-
tractabilities in the conceptual components of decision. As I shall
develop more fully, I think it is impossible consistently to apply
Pennoyer and International Shoe. Hanson v. Denckla, in its futile
attempt to accommodate both, reveals the depth of the doctrinal
chasm between them.
After Hanson v. Denckla the Supreme Court did not again strug-
gle with the Pennoyer problem"l until last Term when it decided
two cases that subject the Pennoyer conceptual structure to further
stress and, at the same time, contain useful bases for erecting a
new structure. These were United States v. First National City
Bank 2 and Texas v. New Jersey.8 The Citibank case involved the
issuance of an injunction by the United States District Court for the
10 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
11 The Court did decide cases of relevance. These include Western Union v.
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208
(1962); and Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
12 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
13 379 U.S. 674 (1965), final decree 380 U.S. 518 (1965).
[1965
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Southern District of New York against the First National City
Bank, whose headquarters are in Manhattan, that temporarily re-
strained the bank from honoring withdrawals of funds that had
been deposited at its Montevideo, Uruguay, office by a Uruguayan
corporation which allegedly owed income tax to the Government.
Texas v. New Jersey involved claims of escheat by Texas, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and other states against funds held by the Sun
Oil Co., a New Jersey corporation with headquarters in Philadel-
phia, the funds being the product of transactions in Texas with per-
sons who were, inter alia, Floridians.
What the Court decided in these two cases, and how it reached
decision, seems useful, interesting, and supportive of a theory of
jurisdiction that can displace Pennoyer. I will suggest such a theory
in these pages, and in the process indicate the relevance of the two
new cases to the general problem of jurisdiction. I will proceed by
the following steps: first, observations on the historical setting of
Pennoyer itself; second, consideration of the rationale in Pennoyer;
third, review of some of the practical and conceptual difficulties
created by the Pennoyer rationale; and, finally, suggestions for a
different approach.
I. PENNOYEtR IN HIsToRIcAL SETTING
In deciding Pennoyer v. Neff, Justice Field undertook to
establish a workable and consistent solution to two long-standing
problems in the administration of civil remedies in the United
States. The first problem is to provide decent assurance that a de-
fendant in litigation be given reasonable notice of the pendency of
proceedings against him. The second is to restrict the judicial reme-
dial power of the respective states to matters of proper local con-
cer.
The issues are put in these terms advisedly. To begin with the
premise that the jurisdictional problem is a territorial one may
appeal to beg a central question in the conflict of laws.14 I do not
wish to deny the relevance of party intention, public interest, and
other factors in assessing the appropriateness of a particular forum.
Even with these, a geographical problem usually remains, at least in
choice of forum that must be made within the United States. The
homogeneity of the federal union, as distinguished from the hetero-
14 See Yntema, note 8 supra; EHRENZWEIG, CoNFLicr oF LAWS 3-16 (1962).
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geneity of the international community, makes choice of forum
among United States courts rather a technical, legal problem than
one of major political dimensions. The discussion in these pages is
focused on the situation in the United States as a national rather
than an international community. It has often been remarked that
interstate jurisdictional and choice of laws problems are different
from international ones,' 5 but it has not so often been brought to
mind why they are different.
The jurisdictional problem in the United States is distinctive be-
cause, while the country is socially and economically essentially a
unitary state, legally and politically it is in many respects a federa-
tion of distinct polities. It is this conjunction of circumstances that is
peculiar. Our citizens have a legal right to move from state to state' "
and cultural homogeneity makes it easy and inviting to do so. It is
notorious that we are a mobile population, and we have been such
since the beginning, as the lives of Franklin, Lincoln, and Stephen
Field himself illustrate. Our citizens also have a legal right to project
themselves commercially into all parts of the nation, not only to
trade but to invest in business, to draw out profits, to buy property,
and to become economically domesticated.1 7 The vastness and rich-
ness of the land has made wide-ranging economic adventure attrac-
tive. And this, too, has been true since the beginning of our history.
Without these social and economic conditions, the federation could
have remained an aggregation of social islands whose transactions
inter sese, and whose conflicts and jurisdictional problems, would
have remained the ancient and essentially simple ones of the mer-
chant traders. (This, together with certain fairly standard problems
of domestic relations, is what international conflict of laws was most-
ly about until the last two decades.)
At the same time, the legal and political pluralism of the American
federation is also significant. If this were legally a unitary state, the
problems of notice and of territorial jurisdiction would descend to
those of venue. 18 In fact, however, the states are autonomous in pre-
15 See Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 959
(1952); see also EHRENZWFIG, op. cit. supra note 14, at 16 n. 7.
16 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
17 See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
18 In a country this large, venue is not an inconsiderable problem. Cf. Kitch,
Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice? 40 INn.
[1965
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cisely the respects that are relevant to the problems of judicial juris-
diction. The states are chiefly responsible in our federal union for
the promulgation and enforcement of legal rules governing private
relations and for the maintenance and operation of civil courts.
Autonomy in respect to private law requires rules for choice of law,
which in turn can be devised at least in part in terms of choice of
forum. In any event, the existence of coordinate tribunals of pre-
sumptively equal competence requires rules for choice of forum,
and there seems nothing artificial in conceiving of them as rules of
jurisdiction and in a real sense territorial.
The peculiar features of the jurisdictional problem in the United
States, then, is that our national economic and social unity is con-
ducive to the full panoply of substantive transactions found in-
ternally in a unitary state but our political plurality requires a choice
of law and jurisdictional rules as among separate sovereigns. The
combination would be unendurable as a practical matter but for two
facts. First, there are powerful historical and cultural forces that
conduce to similarity and reciprocity of state law. Second, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause embody judi-
cially enforceable limitations on state-court authority. However in-
terpreted from time to time, they make state-court jurisdiction a
matter of American municipal law and not a species of demi-inter-
national law.
Finally, it may be suggested that the simultaneous existence of
economic and social homogeneity with judicial and private-law di-
versity has tended to magnify small problems and nice distinctions in
the American law of jurisdiction and conflicts. If there were eco-
nomic barriers and if there were social disengagement from state to
state, it would have been impossible to solve the problems of juris-
diction and choice of law by the needlepoint of private case-law
adjudication. They would have been resolved, if at all, in gross
rather than in detail, by legislation rather than by judicial action.
This is not to suggest that interstate jurisdiction in the United States
presents inconsequential problems. It is to suggest, however, that if
the difficulties had been more fundamental they could not have been
resolved, as in fact they have been, by such loose judicial improvisa-
tion. The problems of notice and of jurisdiction will remain with
LJ. 99 (1965); LouisELL & HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDRaAL
421-22 (1962). But it is less of a problem than that which involves the additional
circumstance of variations in governing law.
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us, so long as there is not perfect similarity and reciprocity of law
among the states, that is to say, so long as we remain a federation.
A. THE NOTICE PROBLEM
The notice problem long antedated Pennoyer, although it is not
clear how far back its roots reach. In the common-law courts and
the courts of equity the problem goes back no further than the
eighteenth century, for it was only in that period that the default
judgment was developed in these courts. 9 In the absence of a pro-
19 This development is suggested in the series of statutes permitting use of sum-
mons rather than a capias as initial process in common law actions. 12 Geo. I c.29
(1725), "An Act to Prevent Frivolous and Vexatious Arrests," supplemented by 5
Geo. I c.27 (1732), provided: "No person shall be held to special bail upon any
process issuing out of any superior court, where the cause of action shall not
amount to the sum of ten pounds or upwards ... and [in such cases plaintiff] shall
not arrest or cause to be arrested, the body of the defendant or defendants, but
shall serve him, her, or them personally within the jurisdiction of the court, with a
copy of the process; and if such defendant or defendants shall not appear ... it
might be lawful to and for the plaintiff ... to enter a common appearance ... and
to proceed thereon, as if such defendant... had entered his, her or their appear-
ane. . . "
The Act applied also to actions in inferior courts in which the cause of action
was less than 40 shillings. By 19 Geo. III c.70 (1779), the provisions of the earlier
act were made applicable to causes involving less than £ 10 whether in the inferior
or superior courts. The 1779 Act also provided that where a judgment had been
rendered in an inferior court and execution had been unavailing "and ... the per-
son or persons or effects of the defendant or defendants are not to be found within
the jurisdiction of such inferior court," the record of judgment in the inferior court
might be removed to a superior court at Westminster and writs of execution there-
upon issued on the judgment "in the same manner as upon judgments obtained in
the said courts at Westminster... "
By 43 Geo. ImI cA6 (1803), certain further modifications were introduced and
by 51 Geo. III c.124 (1811), the Act of 1725 was applied to causes involving up to
£15 and to forms of action in which the original process had been by distringas
rather than capias. 7 & 8 Geo. IV c.71 (1827) raised the amount to £20. The Uni-
formity of Process Act, 2 Win. IV c.39 (1832), made the procedure of summons
and default judgment upon failure of appearance applicable in common-law actions
generally. Cf. 1 TiD, PRAcricE 109-15 (9th ed. 1828).
On the equity side, it had been provided by 5 Geo. II c.25 (1732), "That if in
any suit ... commenced in any court of equity, any defendant or defendants,
against whom any Subpoena or other process shall issue, shall not cause his...
appearance to be entered ... and an affidavit... shall be made to the satisfaction
of such court, that such defendant.., is ... beyond the seas, or ... could not be
found so as to be served with such process, and that there is just ground to be-
lieve that such defendant ... absconded, to avoid being served ... [upon court
order, posting and publishing of notice] ... the court being satisfied of the truth
thereof may order the plaintiffs bill to be taken pro confesso... :' See also Mm-
LAR, CrviL PRocuRE oF Tim TRm CoURT iN HisroiucA. P sREcrrE cc. 8, 21
(1952).
HeinOnline -- 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 248 1965
THEORY OF STATE-COURT JURISDICTION 249
cedure for a default judgment, jurisdiction depended on personal
appearance and the question of notice simply did not arise.
Since the Middle Ages,2° a mechanism for default judgment has
existed in the foreign attachment proceedings in local and customary
courts. The best known and no doubt most frequently employed
procedure of this type was that of the Lord Mayor's Court of Lon-
don.21 The London procedure consisted of a garnishment, a pre-
tended effort to serve the defendant personally, a default judgment,
and an appropriation to the plaintiff of the garnished debt, subject to
the right of the defendant to come in within a year and a day to
open up the judgment and litigate the merits.22 The want of notice
in this procedure had occasioned critical comment in the common-
law courts as early as 1772,23 but it seems nevertheless to have sur-
vived well into the nineteenth century. 4
In this country, too, default judgment was an incident of foreign
attachment and with it came the problem of notice. The foreign
attachment procedure appears to have been used chiefly against an
absconding debtor.25 Under the rules prevailing in the nineteenth
century, the defaulted defendant could set aside the attachment by
showing that he had not absconded. An appearance to show that he
had not absconded required that the defendant, in fact, had knowl-
edge of the suit, which in turn mooted the question of notice, for all
practical purposes at least. On the other hand, if the defendant did
not appear-for whatever reason-the default would remain final as
a practical matter, and the question of notice would not be raised.
Either way, therefore, the problem of notice in the foreign attach-
ment cases remained unresolved.
20See generally Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 Mn;N.
L. REv. 1, 7-17 (1942).
21 See Locke, The Law and Practice of Foreign Attachment in the Lord Mayor's
Court, in DmtxE, A TRATISE ON SUITS By ATrAcsmENr IN THE UNITED STATES, Ap-
pendix (2d ed. 1858).
22 See Locke, supra note 21, at 2, 12-13, 19.
23 See Fisher v. Lane, 3 Wils. 297 (C.P. 1772), cited in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
at 732. Compare the quite different report of Fisher v. Lane in 2 Blacks. 834, 95
Eng. Rep. 1065. Cf. Williams v. Lord Bagot, 3 B. & C. 772, 107 Eng. Rep. 920 (K.B.
1825).
24 See London Joint Stock Bank v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London,
5 C.P.D. 494 (CA. 1880). A brief but illuminating description of the London for-
eign attachment procedure is to be found id. at 497-99. See also note 55 infra.
25 See DRAxr, op. cit. supra note 21, at §§ 67, 72 (1st ed. 1854); cf. Mussman &
Riesenfeld, supra note 20, at 14-15.
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The proposition had been frequently reiterated that "not to sum-
mon or give notice to a defendant in a suit commenced against him
is contrary to the first principles of justice.' 26 And it had been said
that a judgment under such circumstances was null and void, uttered
coram non judice, and without force, or validity.27 Nevertheless, the
state courts had been churning out default judgments against un-
served absent defendants, no doubt in continuing response to the felt
need to provide local creditors and property claimants with final
determinations against actually or allegedly departed debtors, part-
ners, and kinfolk.28 Obviously, notice cannot be given to a de-
fendant who, adventitiously or purposely, is unavailable to receive
it. The courts were therefore confronted at an early date with the
need either to qualify the proposition that notice is a prerequisite to
valid judgment or to leave plaintiffs remediless against defendants
who could not be personally served. The latter being inexpedient in
the most fundamental sense, the line of appropriate movement lay in
qualifying the rule about notice.
Qualification of the notice rule was effected in two formulations.
It was said on the one hand that "constructive notice" was the legal
equivalent of personal service at least in some kinds of cases.29 It was
also said that personal service was required only in cases where a
"personal" judgment was sought, but not in proceedings in rem.30
26 Fisher v. Lane, 3 Wils. 297, 302, 95 Eng. Rep. 1065, 1068 (C.P. 1772).
27 See, e.g., Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121 (N.Y. 1818); Harris v. Hardeman, 14
How. 334 (1852); see also the cases collected in Rheinstein, The Constitutional
Bases of jurisdiction, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 793 n. 77 (1955).
28 It is of course a subsisting problem of government to provide efficacious civil
remedies for the redress of debts and the determination of claims to property. E.g.,
compare VAN CAENwEM, ROYAL WRIts iN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEsr To GrLx-
vuL, passim, .ith Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
29 See, e.g., The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144 (1815), where Chief Justice Marshall
said: "[N]otice of the controversy is necessary in order to become a party, and it
is a principle of natural jstice... that before the rights of an individual be bound
by a judicial sentence, he shall have notice, either actual or implied, of the proceed-
ings against him. Where these proceedings are against the person, notice is served
personally, or by publication; where they are in rem, notice is served upon the
thing itself." (Emphasis added.)
30 See, e.g., Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121, 142-43 (N.Y. 1818): "We have re-
fused to sustain an action here, upon a judgment in another state, where the suit
was commenced by attachment, and no personal summons or actual notice given
the defendant, he not being, at the time of issuing the attachment, within such
state. In such cases we have considered the proceedings as in rem, which could only
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The first of these qualifications would admit the efficacy of "con-
structive" notice in cases that might not be regarded as in rem pro-
ceedings; the second would admit the efficacy of proceedings iden-
tified as in rem without any notice at all, constructive or otherwise.
Hence, in the early nineteenth century, while it was recognized
that proceedings on constructive notice and proceedings in rem
were both somehow exceptions to the rule requiring notice, no logi-
cal relationship, and certainly no identity, had been established be-
tween them.31
The notice problem remained in limbo down to the time of
Pennoyer itself. As late as 1870, in Cooper v. Reynolds,82 Justice
Miller had made the following observations, without any apparent
awareness of their inconsistency: 33
Jurisdiction of the person is obtained by the service of proc-
ess, or by voluntary appearance of the party....
[I]n reference to jurisdiction of the person, the statutes of
the States have provided for several kinds of service of original
process short of actual service on the party to be brought be-
fore the court, and the nature and effect of this service...
depend altogether upon the effect given to it by the statute.
[T]he judgment of the court, though in form a personal
judgment against the defendant, has no effect beyond the
property attached in that suit.
We do not deny that there are cases, not partaking of the
nature of proceedings in rem... in which the legislature has
properly made the jurisdiction to depend on this publication
of notice, or on bringing the suits to the notice of the party
in some other mode, when he is not within the territorial ju-
risdiction.
bind the goods attached, and that the judgment has no binding force in personam.
... [T]o bind a defendant personally by a judgment, when he was never person-
ally summoned, nor had notice of the proceedings, would be contrary to the first
principles of justice...." (Emphasis added.)
31 Nor could there have been such an identification within the framework of the
developed law. By 1800, the English common-law courts could enter judgment on
constructive notice in actions for money up to a limited amount and the courts of
equity had long had power to enter decrees pro confesso on service by publication.
See note 19 supra. Whatever else might be included in the concept "in personam
judgment," in this context it clearly included actions for money and proceedings
in equity. Since default judgments were allowed in these types of cases, and since
these types of cases proceeded on constructive notice, it would have been impos-
sible to regard judgments entered on constructive notice as limited to proceedings
in rem.
32 10 Wall. 308 (1870). 33 Id. at 316-17, 318, 319, 320.
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On the eve of Pennoyer, it therefore could not be said what the re-
quirements of notice were. Must the summons be manually de-
livered, delivered at the abode, posted at the abode, publicly pro-
claimed, published in a newspaper? Nor could it be said in what
situations something less than manual delivery of summons would
suffice: actions of attachment, partition, condemnation, quiet tide,
mechanic's lien? In particular, it was fully true then, as Mr. Justice
Jackson later observed in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,34 that "American courts have sometimes classed certain
actions as in rem because personal service of process was not re-
quired, and at other times have held personal service not required
because the action was in rem."
It was clear, moreover, that statutory proceedings leading to
final determinations based on service by publication or other device
of substituted service had been the instruments of travesties of jus-
tice on a broad scale. The cases cited by Justice Field in his opinion
in Pennoyer were abundant illustration, 5 but there were plenty of
others.36 All and all, the law in 1877 with respect to notice was in
sorry condition. Its theoretical structure was an incongruity of arch-
ing principle and subverting qualifications. In practical application it
failed to achieve its expressed objectives.
B. THE PROBLEM OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The protracted confusion in the rules about notice may have con-
tributed to postponing the development of a systematic theory of
territorial jurisdiction in Anglo-American law. A theory of terri-
torial jurisdiction would in any event have been premature in Eng-
land before, say, 1688, or perhaps even 1832. Problems of jurisdic-
tion were the essence of medieval English law and remained signifi-
34 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950). Cf. Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N.Y. 199, 215-
16 (1858).
35 E.g., Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336 (1850), where a settler in Ohio ob-
tained a default decree impressing a lien for work and labor on land patented to
his alleged erstwhile employer; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437 (1850), where the
Sac and Fox Indians had their reservation lands sold in default proceedings to sat-
isfy the lien for services asserted by commissioners of audit who had been ap-
pointed to ascertain the Indians' interest in the lands.
S6 E.g., Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350 (1873) (by Field, J.), 9 Fed. Cas. 1126 (No.
5206) (C.C. Calif. 1874) (proceedings at circuit before Field, J.), and the notorious
Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503 (1874), in which the estate of the deceased
Senator Broderick of California was cleaned out under a forged will administered
in ex parte probate proceedings.
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cant until the period of Victorian reform. But until after 1800 it
would have been impossible, even if it had been thought appropriate,
to disentangle the question of territorial limitations on jurisdiction
from those arising out of charter, prerogative, personal privilege,
corporate liberty, ancient custom, and the fortuities of rules of
pleading, venue, and process. The intricacies of English jurisdic-
tional law of that time resist generalization on any theory except a
franchisal one; they seem certainly not reducible to territorial di-
mension.37
The English precedents on jurisdiction were therefore of little
relevance to American problems of the nineteenth century. Pending
further inquiry, it is necessary to speak with considerable diffidence
on this subject, but it would appear that, until 1830, there was no de-
veloped English common law on what we now call interstate or in-
ternational jurisdiction. Most of the reported cases concerned juris-
dictional relationships within the British Empire-Ireland, Scotland,
and the plantations-and not relationships with the equal sovereign-
ties of Europe. As a result, they are parochial, not only in conceptual
development but also in legal policy. There is an unmistakable ele-
ment of imperial supervision running through the cases, and one can
perceive a tacit assumption that matters of any consequence ordi-
narily should and would be brought to Westminster or Whitehall
for determination."8 Moreover, the attitude toward territorial juris-
diction chiefly reflected two concerns, that the English courts not
get themselves in a position of entering an unenforceable judgment
and that the colonial courts not overreach themselves.
Only a brief statement of the English cases is possible here, but
enough I hope to suggest their dimensions. Until Mostyn v. Fabri-
gas3" in 1774, most of the cases involved the question whether de-
fendants served (and, so far as appears, resident) in England were
37 For this reason a search of the period for precedents supporting modem con-
cepts of jurisdiction based on the principle of forum conveniens seems to me in the
strictest sense anachronistic. Of course the facts of most of the cases sustain a
forum conveniens analysis, as do many of the remarks uttered in the opinions. But
the same is true of most of the cases decided at Pennoyer's apogee in 1900 or
thereabouts, and it would be surprising if the cases manifested any other pattern.
This being so, the cases cannot be read as somehow foreshadowing a point of view
and analysis that they do not enunciate. Here I depart from my friend and mentor,
Albert Ehrenzweig, with whom I share many conclusions but not so many prem-
ises. See EHRENzwmG, op. cit. supra note 14, at 7-8, 88 et seq.
s Cf. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947).
89 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774), see note 46 infra.
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subject to suit in the Court of Chancery over real or personal prop-
erty located elsewhere. A qualified affirmative was given in 1675;4o
a clear one was given shortly thereafter by Lord Chancellor Not-
tingham in Arglasse v. Muschamp.41 A half-century later, Lord
Hardwicke expressed contradictory dicta,42 but in the famous case
of Penn v. Lord Baltimore43 affirmed his jurisdiction. Still later, in
1806, Chancery assumed it had jurisdiction to enjoin the foreclosure
of an allegedly fraudulent contract for the sale of land in the colony
of Demerara.44 It would seem therefore to have been established that
40Cartwright v. Pettus, 2 Ch. Ca. 214, 22 Eng. Rep. 916 (Ch. 1675): "They were
Jointenants of Lands in Ireland; the Plaintiff prays an Account of the Profits, and a
Partition of the Lands.
".... The Lord Chancellor declared, that as to the Profits the Bill was good, the
Person being in England, for they are in the Personality; but as To the Partition,
which was the Realty, he could not here proceed, for he could not award a Com-
mission into Ireland: And the Bill... was in the Nature of a Writ of Partition at
the Common Law, which lieth not in England for Lands in Ireland."
41 1 Vern. 75, 135, 23 Eng. Rep. 322, 369 (Ch. 1682). Nottingham sarcastically ad-
verted to the question whether equity can act in rem, and whether it can only act
so, in words that later generations of legal theorists might have heeded: "This is
surely only a jest put upon the jurisdiction of this court by the common lawyers;
for when you go about to bind the lands, and grant a sequestration to execute a de-
cree, then they readily tell you, that the authority of this court is only to regulate
a man's conscience, and ought not to affect the estate, but that this court must agere
in personam only; and when, as in this case, you prosecute the person for a fraud,
they tell you, you must not intermeddle here, because the fraud, though commit-
ted here, concerns lands that lie in Ireland, which makes the jurisdiction local...."
42 Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543, 26 Eng. Rep. 342 (Ch. 1738); Foster v. Vas-
sall, 3 Atk. 587, 26 Eng. Rep. 1138 (Ch. 1747).
43 1 Ves. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750). This suit was for specific performance
of an agreement settling the boundaries between Pennsylvania and Maryland. The
chief question of jurisdiction was whether the matter was properly in Chancery
rather than the Privy Council. The imperial concerns in the case were, as Hard-
wicke observed, of "great consequence and importance[,] ... it being for the de-
termination of the right and boundaries of two great provincial governments and
three counties; of a nature worthy of judicature of a Roman Senate rather than of
a single judge.. . ." As to the question of territorial jurisdiction, he said: "As to
the court's not enforcing the execution of their judgment; if they could not at all,
I agree, it would be in vain to make a decree; and that the court cannot inforce
their own decree in rem, in the present case ... but the party being in England, I
could inforce it by process of contempt in personam and sequestration, which is
the proper jurisdiction of this court" Cf. Provost of Edinburgh v. Aubery, Amb.
236, 27 Eng. Rep. 157 (1753). See also Concerning the jurisdiction of Chancery in
Foreign Parts, in 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 133, 21 Eng. Rep. 937; Burn v. Cole, Amb. 415, 27
Eng. Rep. 277 (P.C. 1762); Pike v. Hoare, Amb. 428, 27 Eng. Rep. 286 (Ch. 1763).
44 White v. Hall, 12 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 122 (Ch. 1806); of. Cranstown v.
Johnston, 3 Ves. Jr. 170, 30 Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1796), discussed in text infra, at
note 48.
E1965
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a suit would lie in Chancery where the defendant was before the
court, so long as there seemed to be some good reason to assert juris-
diction and relief could effectively be administered, either in the
form of a decree for money or by coercing the defendant to act by
sequestering his local property.
In Mostyn v. Fabrigas and some similar cases, Lord Mansfield sus-
tained actions in England for torts committed elsewhere, in each in-
stance against defendants subjected to process in England. Some of
the actions were ones which under English law were "local" and it
was urged on this account and others that they should have been
dismissed, but jurisdiction was affirmed.45 The defendant's presence
in England seems to have been less a reason for asserting jurisdiction
than an obviation of a reason why it should not be asserted; it could
hardly be said that personal presence was the basis for jurisdiction.
The fact is that each of the cases involved public law implications,
and indeed the assertion of jurisdiction was justified on that ground.48
45 Mostyn v. Fabrigas was an action for trespass for assault and false imprison-
ment by a resident of Minorca against the governor of the island, who had deter-
mined that plaintiff was a troublemaker and summarily packed him off to Spain.
Mansfield refers to unreported cases in the same vein: "At the last sittings there
were two actions brought by Armenian merchants, for assaults and trespasses in
the East Indies.... I have had some actions before me, rather going further than
these transitory actions; that is going to cases which in England would be local ac-
tions: I remember one, I think it was an action brought against Captain Gambier,
who by order of Admiral Boscawen had pulled down the houses of some suders
who supplied the navy and sailors with spiritous liquors.... I overruled the objec-
ton upon this principle, namely, that the reparation here was personal, and for
damages, and that otherwise there would be a failure of justice; for it was upon
the coast of Nova Scotia, where there were no regular Courts of Judicature.... I
quoted a case of an injury of that sort in the East Indies, where even in a Court of
Equity Lord Hardwicke had directed satisfaction to be made in damages....
"I recollect another cause . . . for destroying fishing huts upon the Labrador
coast. After the Treaty of Paris, the Canadians early in the season erected huts for
fishing; and by that means got an advantage, by beginning earlier, of the fishermen
who came from England.... However the admiral from general principles of pol-
icy ordered these huts to be destroyed.... There are no Local Courts among the
Esquimaux Indians upon that part of the Labrador coast; and therefore whatever
injury had been done there by any of the King's officers would have been alto-
gether without redress, if the objection of locality would have held." 1 Cowp. at
180-81, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1031-32.
Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. 204, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (KJ3. 1774), was an action to
recover export duties collected by the defendant as tax collector on the island of
Grenada, duties which plaintiff contended were illegally imposed. No question was
raised as to jurisdiction.
4 6 "[T]hough the charge brought against him is for a civil injury, yet it is like-
wise of a criminal nature; because it is an abuse of the authority delegated to him
by the King's letters patent, under the Great Seal.... So that emphatically the
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A later decision, Doulson v. Matthews,47 refused to entertain an
action for trespass to a dwelling house in Canada on the ground that
the Court of Common Pleas "may try actions here which are in their
nature transitory, though arising out of a transaction abroad, but
not such as are in their nature local." It is hard to say whether the
apparently private character of the dispute was significant and,
therefore, whether or not Mostyn v. Fabrigas was being repudiated
in whole or in part. It is clear nevertheless that the objections to
actions arising abroad were framed in terms of the court's domestic
jurisdictional limitations, so that the cases would have little cogency
in situations, as in the United States, where the domestic jurisdiction
of a state court was not the focus of concern.
These two groups of cases are reducible to the principle that per-
sonal service is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction. A similar theme may underlie a group of cases
at the end of the eighteenth century which concerned the validity
of judgments rendered ex parte on posted notice in island plantation
courts. Cranstown v. Johnston48 was a suit to restrain colonial pro-
ceedings in execution of such a judgment; Buchanan v. Rucker49
was an action to collect such a judgment in England; and Cavan v.
SwtewartO was an action for money due that was defended on the
ground of prior payment, defendant having been garnished in a
colonial court at the suit of a creditor of the present plaintiff. These
cases curiously present a modern textbook trilogy of recognition
problems: stay of foreign proceedings, local affirmative enforce-
ment, local defensive recognition. They were all decided adversely
to the colonial judgments, the first on the ground of lack of notice,5'
governor must be tried in England, to see whether he has exercised the authority
delegated to him by the letters patent legally and properly; or whether he has abused
it in violation of the laws of England, and the trust so reposed in him:' Mostyn v.
Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. at 173, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1028.
474 T.R. 503, 100 Eng. Rep. 1143 (C.P. 1792).
48 3 Ves. Jr. 170, 30 Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1796).
49 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (KB. 1808).
50 1 Stark. 525, 171 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B. 1816).
51 "[A] summons left upon the freehold ... of a person who had no freehold in
possession; who had no tenant, upon whom this constructive notice could be served
... neither that law nor any law in his Majesty's dominions could be, I hope, car-
ried to the extent of authorising a sale without actual or constructive notice."
Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. Jr. at 181, 30 Eng. Rep. at 958.
[1965
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the other two on the ground that the defendant was not shown to
have been present in the colony.
52
The rule applied in the last three cases was, of course, inconsistent
with the practice of foreign attachment that still prevailed in the
Mayor's Court of London.53 Recognition of this may have influ-
enced decision in what appears to be the next English decision,
Douglas v. Forrest in 1828." That was an action on a Scottish de-
fault judgment rendered on notice by "proclamation at the market-
cross of Edinburgh" against a defendant who was a native Scot but
who had departed overseas. The point was pressed in argument that
if the judgment was invalid, so were London foreign attachment
proceedings.r5 The court enforced the Scottish judgment but in
doctrine so cautious that it is difficult to evaluate.5 6 In the last
English decision before 1834, the Court of King's Bench unbent
perhaps a little more in recognizing a foreign judgment, allowing an
action on a judgment rendered in Mauritius for a tort committed
there in which the proceedings had been commenced after de-
fendant had left the island.ST
62 "By persons absent from the island [in the Tobago statute] must necessarily
be understood persons who have been present and within the jurisdiction, so as to
have been subject to the process of the Court; but it can never be applied to a per-
son who for aught appears never was present within or subject to the jurisdiction.'
Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East at 194, 103 Eng. Rep. at 547. "It is perfectly clear on
every principle of justice, that you must either prove that the party was sum-
moned, or at least that he was once on the island:' Cavan v. Stewart, 1 Stark. at
529-30, 171 Eng. Rep. at 552.
5) See notes 21-24 supra. 54 4 Bing. 686, 130 Eng. Rep. 933 (K.B. 1828).
C5 Counsel for the plaintiff said: "Nor is there anything in the practice repug-
nant to the law of England; for under process of foreign attachment in the city
of London, if a creditor issued a summons against a debtor to which there is a
return of nihil, goods belonging to the debtor in the hands of a third person
may be attached; and though DeGray, C. J., in Fisher v. Lane ... expressed his
disapprobation of the practice, yet it has always prevailed... ." 4 Bing. at 693-94,
130 Eng. Rep. at 936.
5 6 'We confine our judgment to a case where the party owed allegiance to the
country in which the judgment was so given against him, from being born in it,
and by the laws of which country his property was, at the time those judgments
were given, protected. The debts were contracted in the country in which the
judgments were given, whilst the debtor resided there.' 4 Bing. at 703, 130 Eng.
Rep. at 940. See also Russell v. Smyth, 9 M. & W. 810, 152 Eng. Rep. 343 (Exch.
1842).
57 Becquet v. MacCarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951, 958-59, 109 Eng. Rep. 1396, 1399
(K.B. 1831): "[Ilt was urged, that it was contrary to the principles of natural
justice that any one should be condemned unheard, and in his absence. Proof,
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Such was the course of English precedent over a period of 150
years. Three things are clear about these cases: They were domi-
nated by considerations of domestic jurisdiction and procedure,
they cannot be reduced to a set of general principles of jurisdiction,
and none of them described jurisdiction in the terms "in personam,"
"in rem," or "quasi in rem," or in equivalent English terms.
This posture of English law seems to have much importance in
the development of the American law of jurisdiction in the early
years of the Republic. After the Revolution, the problem of terri-
torial jurisdiction among the states was very real and very delicate,
and was hardly less so after the adoption of the Constitution with its
vital but mysterious Full Faith and Credit Clause.58 Yet in the resolu-
tion of these problems the American courts had received no helpful
common-law heritage. The crucial fact is that American jurisdic-
tional concepts were largely fashioned by Story out of Continental
sources and particularly the work of the Dutch jurist Huber.59 The
lines of this transmission have apparently not been worked out in de-
tail, but the transmission is not surprising in view of the dearth of
English sources and the receptivity of the colonies to Continental
political and legal philosophy in the eighteenth century.
At all events, it is clear that no later than the early reported
American decisions, a distinction was recognized between jurisdic-
tion in rem and jurisdiction in personam60 in form generally similar
however, was given, that by the law of the colony, in the case of a person for-
merly resident in the island, absenting himself, and not leaving any attorney upon
whom process in a suit might be served, the Procurator-General or his deputy
was bound to take care of interests of such absent party. ... [I]t must be pre-
sumed that he would do whatever was necessary in the discharge of that public
duty; and we cannot take upon ourselves to say that the law is so contrary to
natural justice as to render the judgment void in a case where the process was
so served."
58 Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: An His-
torical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MicH. L. REv. 33, 37 (1957).
5 Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 kL . L. REv. 375 (1919); Yntema,
supra note 8, at 306-07; Rheinstein, supra note 27; Nadelmann, supra note 58, at
77; Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Com-
ment, 5 Am. J. La.A Hisv. 230-31 (1961).
60 Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. 1786): "[Tlhe defendant was an in-
habitant of the state of Connecticut, and not within the jurisdiction of the
[Massachusetts] court, at the time of the pretended service of the writ; therefore,
the court had no legal jurisdiction of the cause. . ." Phelps v. Holker, 1 DalU.
261, 264 (Pa. 1788): "This is a proceeding in rem, and ought not certainly to be
extended further than the property attached. . . . [T]he judgment obtained in
Massachusetts cannot be considered as conclusive evidence of the debt... " And
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to the cognate concepts of the modem Restatement of Conflicts. 1 It
is said on this basis that Justice Story can not properly be credited,
if that is the word, with developing the basic American notions of
state-court jurisdiction.
2
It is quite true that Story did not invent the dichotomy of juris-
diction in personam and jurisdiction in rem. It is also true, as Profes-
sor Nadelmann has said, that Story borrowed from Huber the idea
of the exclusivity of sovereign authority, and the correlative idea of
comity. 5 But Story did two things that Huber had not done and
these are of such significance that Story deserves the attribution for
a good deal.
In the first place, Story worked significant changes in the formu-
lation of Huber's propositions. These changes were achieved by
elaborating implications from Huber, but it is the elaboration that is
important. Huber had put his propositions this way:"4
(1) The laws of each state have force within the limits of that
government and bind all subject to it, but not beyond.
(2) All persons within the limits of a government, whether
they live there permanently or temporarily, are deemed
subjects thereof.
(3) Sovereigns will so act by way of comity....
In Picquet v. Swan, which in certain respects anticipates his
treatise, Story said: 5
see, e.g, Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 41 (N.Y. 1809): "[The defendant's]
domicile was in this state, and being in person here, and not within the jurisdic-
tion of the court of Massachusetts, he was not, and could not have been served
with process. The attachment of an article of his property could not bind him;
it could only bind the goods attached, as a proceeding in ren. .. "' Fenton v.
Garlick, 8 Johns. 194, 197 (N.Y. 1811): "The original suit, in both cases, is rather
a proceeding in rem, than in personam."
61 RsrATEmENT, Co'nrucr oF LAws c.1, Introductory Note; § 32, Comment a.
62 See Nadelmann, supra note 59.
a See STORY, CoMmENrTri.s oN THE CoNF icr oF LAws 19, 30 (1834).
64 As rendered in Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict
of Laws, 20 CoLum. L. REv. 247, 271-72 (1920). (Emphasis added.) Compare the
shorter restatement in Yntema, supra note 8, at 306: "[F]irst, that the laws of
a state (imperii) apply within its territory, binding all those subject thereto,
and not without; second, that all persons, permanently or temporarily commorant
within the territory of a state, are to be deemed subject to its laws; third, that
the rights of each nation exercised within its territory, are by comity recog-
nized as having their effect everywhere... ." (Emphasis added.)
05 19 Fed. Cas. 609, 611, 612 (No. 11,134) (C.C. Mass. 1828). (Emphasis added.)
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[A] court created within and for a particular territory is
bounded in the exercise of its powers by the limits of such
territory....
[N]o sovereignty can extend its process beyond its territo-
rial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial
decisions.
And in his treatise on conflict of laws, Story combined the gen-
erality of Huber with particularities of his own and said this: 6
[E]very nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and juris-
diction within its own territory. The direct consequence of
this rule is, that the laws of every state affect, and bind directly
all property, whether real or personal, within its territory;
and all persons, who are resident within it, whether natural
born subjects, or aliens....
[N]o state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind
property out of its own territory, or persons not resident
therein, whether they are natural born subjects, or others. This
is a natural consequence of the first proposition.
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of these embellish-
ments:
1. A mild statement about territorial sovereignty of states is con-
verted into a rule limiting judicial jurisdiction.
2. The proposition that persons within the territory are subject to
jursidiction is expanded to include property within the jurisdiction.
3. The proposition is advanced that the jurisdiction over persons
and property is exclusive, which does not follow necessarily from
Huber's propositions. The weasel word "directly" is added in antici-
pation of possible difficulties.
In addition to his expansion of Huber's propositions, and equally
important, Story was instrumental in transforming Continental polit-
ical theory into legal rules operative in a federal union. The Con-
tinental theorists were after all just that: They were building intel-
lectual constructs for critical enlightenment, not administering the
law in its intricate routine. Story, by the force of his prose and his
learning, suggested that Huber's concepts were to be used to decide
concrete cases and were consonant with the law as it stood.
In the light of the then existing decisions, this was no mean
achievement. The state of English precedent has already been can-
vassed. 67 Some of those precedents, notably Buchanan v. Rucker,
66 Story, op. cit. supra note 63, at 19, 21. 67 See text supra, at notes 39-57.
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denied the validity of a garnishment judgment rendered in the place
where the property was situated.6 Some, notably Penn v. Lord
Baltimore, had announced the validity of a decree in Chancery that
determined interests in property situated outside the territorial limits
of the court's process.69 And some had enforced foreign in personam
judgments that had been rendered against defendants who had been
neither present nor personally served.7 ° American precedents can
easily be found that are not inconsistent with Story,71 but that
proves little because most of the cases are consistent with a variety
of jurisdictional theories. Aside from Story's own opinion in Pic-
quet v. Swan, there appears to be no case before 1834 that contains
the rhetoric of exclusive jurisdiction found in his treatise. And the
American decisions taken as a whole were as much at variance with
Story's postulates as were the English. 72
In the light of the decided cases and of the wide range of prob-
lems to which jurisdictional rules had been adapted, Story's system
reflected neither decided authority nor critical analysis. Taken
literally, his system permits disposition of the trivial situations where
all persons and all objects of property pertinent to the case are with-
in one territorial precinct, or where none of them is.73 Alternatively,
the system's coherence depends entirely on the distinction between
68 See notes 51 and 52 supra.
09 See notes 40-43 supra.
70 See notes 56 and 57 supra. All the cases referred to were known to Story:
he cited them.
71 See, e.g., note 60 supra; Fisher v. Consequa, 9 Fed. Cas. 120 (No. 4,816) (C.C.
Pa. 1809); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 (1813); Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121
(N.Y. 1818).
72 Thus, there were cases in which a decree compelled transfer of interest in
land located outside the jurisdiction. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148 (1810); Ward
v. Arredondo, Hopk. 213, 223 (N.Y. 1824); Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige 606 (N.Y.
1831). There were cases refusing to exercise jurisdiction over persons served per-
sonally or refusing to recognize its exercise by another court. Tingley v. Bate-
man, 10 Mass. 344, 346 (1813); Mead v. Merrit, 2 Paige 402 (N.Y. 1831); Fenton
v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 194 (1811). There were dicta that a nonresident could ap-
pear and contest in a proceeding in which his property had been attached without
thereby being subject to personal jurisdiction. Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 469
(1813); Pawling v. Bird's Ex'rs, 13 Johns. 192, 207 (1816). And there was a case
in which a creditor's claim against his debtor was extinguished in a foreign gar-
nishment proceeding to which he was not a party. Taylor v. Phelps, 1 Harris &
Gill 492 (Md. 1827).
73 See Lawrence v. Smith, 5 Mass. 362 (1809).
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"directly" affecting persons or property and "indirectly" doing so.74
If this is the correct interpretation, then the system is question-beg-
ging. These difficulties will be explored presently.
Finally, it should be noted that Story was not indifferent to the
problem of notice.75 He did not, however, indicate how it would be
possible to give notice to a person absent from the jurisdiction con-
sistent with the rule that "no sovereignty can extend its process be-
yond its own territorial limits. '76 Since the key notice problems had
arisen in regard to persons absent from the jurisdiction, Story's sys-
tem left the question of notice suspended in irresolution.
II. THE RATIONALE OF PENNOYER
It will have to await further study to say to what extent
Story's propositions were influential in the interval between his first
edition and the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.77 There is no question,
however, that Story influenced Pennoyer v. Neff itself. The basic
organization, the intellectual structure, and much of the language of
Justice Field's opinion is taken straight from Story, with the conse-
quence that all the logical and practical difficulties implicit in Story's
system were translated wholesale into constitutional law. Moreover,
fateful and astonishing, Justice Field justified adoption of Story in
part because he saw it as a solution to the notice problem. That dis-
mal inspiration has begotten difficulty ever since.
The opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff is in some respects not well or-
ganized, 7 but its main features are straightforward: A statement of
74 This seems to be the way Story conceived his system. Of the equity decree
concerning foreign lands, he said that "the Court of Chancery will not act di-
rectly upon [foreign] lands." STORY, op. cit. supra note 63, at 457. He did not
notice the contradiction between his notion of exclusive jurisdiction and the
concept of foreign attachment. Id. at 461. And he ignored the implications of
the cases recognizing in personam jurisdiction based on domicile. Id. at 459-61,
discussed supra, at note 56.
75 Id. at, e.g., 458-59. 16 Id. at 450.
77 It is said that Story's influence was substantial. See, e.g., Lorenzen, Story's
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After, 48 HARv. L.
Rzv. 15 (1934). Clearly it was of consequence. See, e.g., French v. Hall, 9 N.H.
137 (1838); DeWitt v. Burnett, 3 Barb. 89 (N.Y. 1848). But it is impossible to
determine how important it was without a careful analysis of the cases.
78 The statement of facts begins in 95 US. at 719-20, is interrupted at 720 by a
recitation of certain propositions based on Story and the citation of Darcy v.
Ketcham, 11 How. 165 (1850), returns at 721 to a consideration of the circum-
stances attending the publication itself, and only then, at 722, swings into the
[1965
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the facts,79 recitation of Story's principles including the qualification
that they apply only to "direct" exercise of authority,80 a review of
the authorities said to support the Story principles,8 ' a justification
of the "seizure" requirement in terms of notice and intrinsic neces-
sity,8 2 a reference to the new Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause,8 3 and, finally, a brushing aside of the annoying inconsist-
encies of divorce jurisdiction and substituted service on corpora-
tions and business associations.
8 4
Often as Pennoyer has been rehashed, the main features of the
argument are worth some examination. First, it is interesting to ob-
serve the premise on which Story's principles of sovereignty were
accepted. The principles, said Justice Field, are "principles of public
law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over persons
and property. The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in
every respect independent.... But, except as restrained and limited
by [the Constitution], they possess and exercise the power of inde-
pendent States, and the principles of public law to which we have
referred are applicable to them."' If this premise were fully ac-
main body of argument. Story's principles are reiterated at 722, and Darcy v.
Ketcham is cited again and discussed at length at 729-30.
One apparent oddity of the case is that the dissenting opinion of Justice Hunt
says, at 743, that Galpin v. Page, note 36 supra, "is cited in hostility to the views
I have expressed." In fact, this case is not cited in Field's opinion.
These two circumstances suggest that Field's published opinion is a rewrite, the
first part of which survived from a draft in which he made short work of the
case but which had to be revised to meet a vigorous dissent.
79 95 US. at 719-22. The action was one of ejectment by which Neff sought to
recover a tract of Oregon land formerly his. Pennoyer's defense was that he held
title by virtue of a sheriff's deed given at an execution sale upon an earlier judg-
ment against Neff in favor of one Mitchell. (Mitchell's action against Neff had
been for recovery of fees rendered as an attorney.) At issue therefore was the
validity of the execution sale and the judgment it undertook to enforce.
There had been no personal service in the action of Mitchell v. Neff, Neff
having been out of the state. There had been newspaper publication of notice of
the suit, a default judgment, and then the execution sale. Neff contended the
judgment was invalid because of a failure to comply with the Oregon statutes
specifying the procedure for publication. It does not appear that he contended
the procedure was invalid in any event because it did not provide for "seizure"
of the property before entry of judgment; this seems to have been a suggestion
advanced by the Court itself.
80 ld. at 722-23; cf. id. at 734. 81 Id. at 724-26, 728-32.
82 Id. at 726-28. 83 id. at 733. 84 Id. at 734-36.
85 Id. at 722. (Emphasis added.) Justice Field acknowledged that "many of the
rights and powers which originally belong to them [were] now vested in the gov-
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cepted, the opinion should have stopped there, for under the prin-
ciples said to apply to such independencies the acts of the sovereign
state of Oregon in its own territory were beyond scrutiny. On the
other hand, if the states are in truth sovereign only in a limited way,
the question of proper limitations cannot have been reached from
a proposition that excluded the possibility of limitation. This was the
first analytical miscarriage in Pennoyer.
Field then stated Story's propositions: 86
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property with-
in its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power
to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its
inhabitants ...and also to regulate the manner and condi-
tions upon which property situated within such territory,
both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and trans-
ferred. The other principle . . . follows from the one men-
tioned; that is, that no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory.
The difficulty with these propositions has been intimated,17 but
some amplification is appropriate. The first principle can be taken
as a legal and political truism, that in a modem independent political
regime the lawgiving and law-enforcing agencies of that regime,
and not of some other, regulate the affairs of person and property in
the territory ruled by that regime. They are not regulated, that
is, by the Holy Roman Emperor, the law of God as uttered by
anointed kings, or the prescriptions of the United Nations. Alter-
natively, the principle can be taken as a statement of positivist legal
theory, that the law of a particular place is the emanation of an
identifiable political organization and not a logical extension or local
emiment created by the Constitution." Ibid. Powers such as that of making war
and peace, maintaining the army and navy, providing a coinage, building an inter-
state navigational and rail system, and disposing of the western lands constituting
nine-tenths of the national geographic area. Justice Field failed to mention that
the Constitution also withdrew certain powers from the states and by this negative
means tended to unify the nation: the powers to exclude citizens of sister states
or to deny them equal privileges and immunities, to re-evaluate sister-state judg-
ments, and, following the civil disturbance lately concluded, to deny any person
due process or equal protection of the laws. It is difficult to imagine what diminu-
tion of state powers would have sufficed to change Justice Field's premise; it was
surely an ideological fixation rather than an attempted statement of legal fact.
86 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) Compare Story's formulation, text supra, at note 66.
87 See text~supra, at note 73.
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variation of natural or universal law. The principle can also be taken
as a statement of the political attitude which sovereign states mani-
fest toward their relations with other sovereign states, one of jealous
concern for a local monopoly of political power and legal au-
thority.s8
There are doubtless other ways in which the Story principles can
be understood that are equally true and enlightening. But the one
context in which the principles are either not true or not enlighten-
ing is precisely that in which they have been typically invoked, that
is, in the adjudication of civil controversies having multistate ele-
ments. If no multistate elements are involved, because either all ele-
ments are in a particular state or none of them is, the formulation of
a jurisdictional principle is purely a scholastic exercise. Since in such
a case there is no problem in reality, no boundaries of reality exist to
confine conceptual imagination within contours of fact, policy, and
definition that real legal problems entail.
On the other hand, when adjudication of civil controversies does
involve multistate elements, it is fatuous to think of any court having
exclusive jurisdiction of anything. The jurisdictional problem exists
precisely because there is no single tribunal that has exclusive juris-
diction in the territorial sense. This is quite apparent in cases where
persons who are within the territorial jurisdiction litigate claims to
property outside the territory, such as the suit for specific per-
formance of land located elsewhere. s9 It is equally apparent in cases
determining claims to property within the territorial jurisdiction
that are asserted by persons who are outside the territory.10
Two other situations are believed to have characteristics such that
they can be placed in a category of exclusive jurisdiction. It is this
belief that appears to be responsible for perpetuation of the Story
principles as restated in Pennoyer. The first of these situations is the
ordinary action for money damages, in which it is thought that
88 The second principle is a corollary or an extension pari materia, however the
first is interpreted.
89 These are cases of the Penn v. Lord Baltimore type. See notes 40-44 and 72
supra.
00 Foreign attachment cases are of this type, for the local property interest of
an absent alleged debtor is converted into a property interest of the attaching
creditor. See text supra, at notes 20-25. So are suits to remove clouds on title of
local real property, e.g., Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890), or to conclude
claims to or against personal property or a fund, cf., e.g., Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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jurisdiction relates only to the person of the defendant because the
essence of the proceeding concerns his personal legal duty and obli-
gation. An action for damages does indeed concern the personal legal
duty and obligation of the defendant, but it does so in no different
sense than does, say, an action for specific performance or for an
injunction against waste. The elements of the obligation to be en-
forced are quite independent of the kind of remedy sought to be
obtained. Indeed, in all cases in theory, and in many cases in fact,
the remedy for a given breach of obligation can be either damages
or specific relief. Since there is no analytical difference between the
obligation that gives rise to a claim for compensatory damages and
that which gives rise to injunctive relief, the obligation cannot be
used to differentiate the jurisdictional concepts applicable to the
respective situations. Accordingly, the damage action cannot be
distinguished from specific performance or other types of injunctive
relief as a uniquely in personam proceeding.
The obligation involved in a damage action, moreover, is of prac-
tical interest because it is the predicate for a determination of a
property interest. As every plaintiff's lawyer knows, an in personam
judgment is of operative significance only because and to the extent
that it is the initial stage of a compensatory transfer of defendant's
property to the plaintiff. When this is done by rendition of a judg-
ment in state A followed by execution and sale of defendant's land
in state A, it is perfectly obvious that the proceedings taken as a
whole concern both defendant and his property. It should be no
less obvious when the judgment of state A is reduced to judgment
in state B and defendant's property in that state is then forfeited to
the plaintiff.91 Hence, it is not possible to isolate the money judg-
ment for damages into a special category of truly exclusive in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the defendant. If the judgment is entitled to
91 By force of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it is legally obligatory in state B
that the judgment of state A be taken as conclusive, reduced to a local judgment,
and enforced. This procedure is somewhat more complicated than execution pro-
ceedings against property in state A would have been and the complications may
have serious practical dimensions. But neither of these circumstances detracts from
the fact that the judgment of state A was the basis for a conclusive alteration of
property interests in state B. Hence, it is not true to say that the judgment in
state A merely affects the defendant personally and does not involve his property
in state B.
Attachment proceedings, though brought to enforce in personam obligations,
obviously involve claims to property. An ordinary money judgment cum execution
may be thought of as a delayed and complicated form of attachment.
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recognition in state B, the state A proceedings that led to the
judgment affect property in state B in no more restricted sense than
a state A decree of specific performance would affect the property
in state B.
The other type of case with multistate elements that is thought
nevertheless to involve exclusive jurisdiction is the so-called true
in rem proceeding. In this kind of proceeding, an object of property
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is identified as the
subject of jurisdiction. Upon specified procedures, such as publica-
tion or issuance of a monition, interests in the property are estab-
lished "against all the world." 92 But this kind of proceeding also
involves people as well as the object of property. "The whole
world" that is said to be bound by such proceedings after all consists
of individual persons, even though for res judicata purposes they
are lumped together as a large-size crowd. To foreclose the interests
and claims of an indeterminate number of persons is operationally
no different than to do so vis-a'-vis one or more specified persons, as
in the case of foreign attachments. That an indeterminate absentee's
claims are foreclosed upon lesser notice than those of a determinate
absentee does not alter the fact that the absentee, whoever and
wherever he may be, is having his rights to the property adjudi-
cated. That being so, the exercise of jurisdiction in such a proceed-
ing is not without legal consequence to persons elsewhere and
should not be thought of as somehow being in rem in a way differ-
ent from a garnishment proceeding against an absentee.9 3
92 The archetype is said to be the admiralty condemnation proceeding, though the
effect of the decree in such cases is supported largely if not entirely by dicta.
See The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144-45 (1815). See LoUsELL & HAZARD, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 356-57.
93 Cf. Holmes, J., in Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass.
71, 76 (1900): "If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against
some particular person ... or to bar some individual claim or objection ... the
action is in personam, although it may concern the right to, or possession of, a
tangible thing.... If on the other hand the object is to bar indifferently all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established ... the proceeding is in rem.... All proceedings, like all rights, are
really against persons. Whether they are proceedings or rights in rem depends
on the number of persons affected."
This statement has been taken as demonstrating an inherent difference between
in rem and in personarn proceedings. It seems to me to have precisely the opposite
implications. To test the point, it would be pertinent to ask how many persons
would be a sufficient number, and what degree of uncertainty in their identifica-
tion would suffice, to transform a particular proceeding from one in personam to
one in rem, Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra note 90.
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In this light, it is impossible satisfactorily to maintain the idea that
exclusive jurisdiction can be exercised in any class of cases with
multistate elements. Focusing attention on the person of the defend-
ant before the court does not render a proceeding purely in per-
sonam, if the defendant has property elsewhere that will have its
legal status affected by the proceeding. Focusing attention on an
object of property before the court does not render a proceeding
purely in rem, if there are persons elsewhere whose legal interest
in the property will be affected by the proceeding. The categorical
structure of proceedings in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem
collapses. Upon its collapse all that remains are the facts that in cases
with multistate elements, sometimes the persons concerned are with-
in the court's territorial jurisdiction but the property concerned is
not, and sometimes the reverse is true, and there is in such situations
a problem of determining whether one or more coordinate courts
can appropriately award a civil remedy in the circumstances 4 This
is but a return to the starting point of the inquiry.
The third step of Field's opinion was a review of the previously
decided cases for the purpose of showing their consistency with
the Story system. This may be passed with the statement that the
demonstration withstands critical analysis no better than Story's
own effort to do so. 5
94Perhaps a word more may be said about the wisdom and utility of trying
to distinguish between "directly" affecting persons or property elsewhere and
doing so "indirectly." Both Story and Field attempted this distinction, Field with
this statement: "But as contracts made in one State may be enforceable only in
another State, and property may be held by non-residents, the exercise of juris-
diction which every State is admitted to possess over persons and property within
its own territory will often affect persons and property without it. To any in-
fluence exerted in this way.., no objection can justly be taken; whilst any direct
exertion of authority upon them . . . would be deemed an encroachment upon
the independence of the State in which the persons are domiciled or the property
is situated....
"Thus the State ... may compel persons ... to execute ... respecting prop-
erty elsewhere situated ... instruments ... to transfer the tide ....
"So the State . . . may . .. appropriate any property owned by . . . non-resi-
dents to satisfy the claims of its citizens." 95 U.S. at 723.
Surely it is odd to think of a decree compelling a transfer of land as "indi-
rectly" affecting the land and the extinction of a person's valid interest to prop-
erty as only "indirectly" affecting his personal rights. It is also difficult to see how
these processes differ from an execution sale and an imposition of judgment lia-
bility, respectively. And to say that the difference lies in the fact that the former
are valid but the latter invalid assumes the answer to the question being addressed.
95 Compare text and footnotes supra, at notes 67-72.
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The fourth step was new and, all things considered, perhaps the
most unfortunate of all. This was the proposition that where juris-
diction was founded on the presence of property within the state, it
was essential to "seize" the property prior to judgment. This prop-
osition appears to have been wholly novel, for the existing authority
seemed to require only that the writ of attachment be "levied" prior
to judgment. A levy on personal property required actual or "con-
structive" seizure but a levy on real property was apparently
achieved by the sheriff's filing papers at the courthouse. 96
Justice Field's argument in support of the seizure requirement was
twofold, of which the first branch is the important one.97 Field
argued that seizure was essential as a matter of notice. After alluding
to the dangers inherent in rendering money judgments without
notice,98 he explained why seizure should be required in cases
where jurisdiction was based on the presence of property: 99
96See Drake, op. cit. supra note 21, at § 231 (1st ed. 1854): "The requisites of
an attachment of real estate are generally determined by statute. Where, however,
that is not the case, the rule which has obtained in Maine and Massachusetts would
probably be received and applied-that it is not necessary for the officer to go
upon the land, or into its vicinity, or see it, or do any other act than make return
upon the writ that he had attached it." The same statement is repeated in § 236 of
Drake's third edition published in 1866.
It is worthwhile noting that it was on this point-the requirement of seizure-
that the Court divided in Pennoyer v. Neff. The dissent by Justice Hunt argued
that seizure was not required because the procedures for exercising jurisdiction by
attachment and garnishment "are exclusively within the judgment of the legisla-
ture, and.., the judiciary cannot review them." 95 U.S. at 747. So far from dis-
agreeing with Field on the theory of jurisdiction, Justice Hunt was remorselessly
more doctrinaire.
97 The second branch of the argument was that unless there were a seizure in
advance of judgment, it could not be determined whether the judgment was an
effort to determine interests in local property, which would be valid, or an effort
to render a judgment of personal liability without personal service, which would
be invalid. "[I]t would . . . make the validity of the proceedings and judgment
depend upon the question whether, before the levy of execution, the defendant had
or had not disposed of the property. . . . This doctrine would introduce a new
element of uncertainty in judicial proceedings." 96 U.S. at 728. The argument is
not particularly convincing but, in any event, is of no direct relevance to the
formulation of the jurisdictional principles themselves.
98 95 US. at 726: "If, without personal service, judgments in personam, obtained
ex parte against non-residents and absent parties, upon mere publication of process,
which, in the great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested,
could be upheld and enforced, they would be the constant instruments of fraud
and oppression."
09 Id. at 727.
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Substituted service by publication ... may be sufficient to
inform the parties . .. where the property is once brought
under the control of the court by seizure or some equivalent
act. The law assumes that property is always in the possession
of its owner, by person or by agent; and it proceeds on the
theory that its seizure will inform him....
However, he said, publication was ineffectual to found jurisdiction
in personam because: 100
Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into an-
other State.... Publication of process or notice cannot create
any greater obligation upon the non-resident to appear.
These propositions were of major significance. The equation of
seizure with notice was tendered as an answer to the objection that
it was unfair to condemn an absentee's property without notice.
This meant, for however long the Court adhered to this proposition,
that absentees whose property was being appropriated in in rem
proceedings were "deemed" notified by the seizure, which, in fact,
would not necessarily have that effect, or by the publication that
accompanied the seizure. Thus, the defendant was relegated to
chance notice: As Justice Field noted, "mere publication of process
... in the great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties
interested."' 01 In addition, affirmance of the proposition that "proc-
ess cannot run into another state" precluded the possibility that
conscientious states might try to provide better notice than publica-
tion. Not only was notice to absentees not required; in legal con-
templation it could not even be given.
Justice Field then went on to assert that the limitations on state-
court jurisdiction were matters within the purview of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This rested on better
ground in the precedents than is sometimes assumed and in any
event can be passed as a now accepted and workable legal premise.
10 2
100 Ibid. 101 See note 98 supra.
102The idea that a court without jurisdiction was coram non judice and that
its judgments were a nullity goes back to medieval law. Historically, the leading
case is probably the Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027
(K.B. 1613). Fisher v. Lane, 3 Wils. 297, 95 Eng. Rep. 1065 (C.P. 1772), expresses
the same view in terms of the "first principles of justice," which were echoed down
the century. The New York State constitutional provision on due process had been
referred to with approval in a challenge of a judgment in Matter of Empire City
Bank, 18 N.Y. 199, 215-16 (1858), and Happy v. Mosher, 48 N.Y. 313 (1872). And
Justice Cooley, in his new Co _ENTARIms ON CoNs'nrtrrroNAL LMITATIONS
[1965
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The last step in Justice Field's opinion was his attempt to deal
with cases that were not apparently reconcilable with the proposi-
tions he had so uncompromisingly advanced. "To prevent any mis-
apprehension," he said, "we do not mean to assert" that a state
might not, first, conclusively determine the status of its citizens
vis-i-vis persons outside the state, referring in particular to divorce
proceedings, 0 3 and, second, require a foreign corporation or a
"partnership or association" to appoint a local agent for service of
process. 04 It is necessary only to suggest why these exceptions are
baffling: the absent spouse and the absent business association are
affected by the proceedings he specified in no lesser way than pro-
ceedings which he had earlier said could not affect absentees. The
only coherent explanation of these inconsistencies is that Justice
Field was simply freezing the procedural status quo.
Appraised by contemporary critical standards for assessing logic
and policy in judicial decision, Pennoyer v. Neff arouses dismay
and even despair. It is an example par excellence of what Karl
Llewellyn called the Formal Style in juristic reasoning.105 That it
402-07 (3d ed. 1874), had emphatically pronounced that the question of jurisdic-
tion was a matter of due process, citing good authority in support. That the Four-
teenth Amendment was not effective at the time of the entry of the state-court
judgment is not relevant to the validity of the argument.
103 95 US. at 734-35. His solicitude for ex parte divorce was prompted by rec-
ognition that if the guilty party absented himself, the complaining party might
"be without redress.' Id. at 735. One wonders why Justice Field did not see the
general relevance of that expedient consideration.
104 95 US. at 735. Justice Field did not notice that there was a material differ-
ence in the legal basis on which a state could compel a foreign corporation to
appoint a local agent and the basis on which it might lay down a similar require-
ment regarding partnerships and associations. A foreign corporation could be ex-
cluded from local entry under Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (1839), and
with that leverage compelled to appoint an agent, Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French,
18 How. 404 (1856). But a partnership or association was regarded as an aggregate
of citizens and as such could not be excluded from a state because of the prohi-
bitions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. If Justice Field had in mind some
other legal basis on which a state could compel appointment of an agent, he did
not intimate it.
He also said explicitly that in default of appointment of an agent, the state could
validly provide for service on a state official instead and thereupon enter judgment
"binding upon the non-residents both within and without the State." 95 U.S. at
735. How this reconciled with the proposition that "no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory," id. at
722, he did not explain.
105 LLEwaLLYN, THE CoMmON LAw Tarnxox 38-39 (1960).
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survives at all is some kind of a monument to American legal
thought.
III. PENNOYER iN AscE;NDANcE AND DEcLINm
Pennoyer v. Neff dominated the American law of jurisdic-
tion for nearly three-quarters of a century down to the decision
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.1 6 It is accordingly re-
garded as "the law" in that period, although it had a less secure
place in particular application than it did in general theory. There
are in any event three aspects to the Pennoyer regime that can be
separately identified. First, Pennoyer's principle limiting the reach
of state-court process proved highly inconvenient in automobile
accident cases and in actions against corporations. The adjustment
to these inconveniences culminated in an abandonment of the prin-
ciple. Second, its rule that seizure is notice proved to be an engine
of injustice and has been repudiated. Third, Pennoyer's categorical
differentiation between actions in personam and actions in rem
proved impossible to maintain with consistency and predictability.
These developments did not appear at the same time: The auto-
mobile cases came to a head in the 1920's and the corporation cases
in the 1940's; the notice problem was not pressed hard until the
Mullane case in 1950107 and has not yet made its full impression;0 8
and the confusion arising out of the categorical structure has only
recently reached critical proportions, largely as a result of the
changes in the other two aspects of Pennoyer.
The difficulties with Pennoyer's first aspect, the territorial limi-
tation on service of process in damages actions, is a tale so often
told that it can be foreshortened. With respect to corporations, the
cue was taken from Justice Field's concluding dictum that the states
could require foreign corporations doing local business to appoint
an agent for service of process and could provide that if they failed
to do so, effective substituted service could be made on an officer
of the state.10 9 The states that had no statutes of this sort soon
enacted them. The pattern being fixed, the disputed question was
106 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
107 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
108 Compare Note, In Rem Actions-Adequacy of Notice, 25 TENN. L. REv. 495
(1958), with, e.g., Stevens v. Torregano, 192 Cal. App.2d 105 (1961).
109 See text supra, at note 104.
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whether, in cases where the corporation had not appointed an
agent, the local activity of the corporation was sufficient to sustain
substituted service of process. 10 For a long time the inquiry was
whether the local activity was sufficient so that it could be said that
the corporation was "present" in the state, in deference to Pennoy-
er's major theoretical premise that presence was required. Judge
Learned Hand's exposure of this fiction"" was approved in Inter-
national Shoe" 2 and the question of amenability to service was re-
cast in terms of "minimum contacts."" 8.1
There is a sidelight in this development that is worth noting.
Under Pennoyer, the theory was that where the corporation failed
to appoint an agent, the state official designated to receive substi-
tuted service was the agent of the corporation. (This was essential
under the theory because otherwise the corporation would not have
been served within the territorial boundaries of the state.) Taking
this literally, it would follow that a default judgment entered after
service on the state official would be valid, he being the corporation's
agent and acting on its behalf, even if he threw the process into his
110 At one point, the logic by which Justice Field had approved substituted
service on foreign corporations reappeared to create difficulties. The theory of
substituted service on foreign corporations was that since the state could refuse to
recognize the local existence of a foreign corporation, it could enforce the less
rigorous measure of requiring actual or constructive appointment of an agent as a
condition of local entry. After Pennoyer had been decided, it was established that
a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce had a constitu-
tional privilege under the Commerce Clause to carry out that commerce locally
despite the state's opposition. See Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914).
This undermined the theoretical basis for substituted service of process on foreign
corporations engaged exclusively in interstate business. But the gap was soon closed
by the proposition that local activity, even though immune from state restriction,
constituted "presence" and therefore subjected the corporation to service of process
under the rule in Pennoyer. This was one of the improvisations that at the same
time modernized the law and preserved Pennoyer from earlier repudiation.
M Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
112 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13 "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" Id. at 316.
The fuller history of this development and the parallel ones presently referred
to in the text is given in Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause,
and the In Personan Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 569 (1958);
Note, Developments in the Law-State-Court jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 909
(1960).
HeinOnline -- 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 273 1965
274 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
wastebasket. Substantially this kind of a problem did arise, and the
Supreme Court of the time had no difficulty in sustaining the judg-
ment even though the corporation apparently had no notice of the
suit against it.114 This rule is obsolete now but it is indicative of the
difficulties into which Pennoyer could lead.
The automobile accident problem-the visiting motorist who
strikes and then retreats home before he can be served-required
similar manipulation of the Pennoyer system. The agency device
was again employed to escape the territorial restrictions on service
of process, the idea being that the visiting motorist appointed the
state's secretary of state as agent for process in return for being
allowed to drive on the local roads. 15 It, too, was taken literally in
certain states, which provided for service on the secretary of state
but did not provide for giving notice of the suit to the absent motor-
ist. In a decision whose result seems entirely sound but which is
unattainable within the Pennoyer system, the Court held that mail
notice to the absentee, or its equivalent, was required by due
process."16
These two lines of expansion of state-court jurisdiction merged
following International Shoe. They now sustain the widely enacted
"long arm" statutes, which provide for service of process against
absentees who have committed a local tort, entered a local contract,
own local property, and sundry variations." 7 Unless the 1958 de-
cision in Hanson v. Denckla"s augurs a retreat, which seems most
unlikely, the theoretical structure of the rules for service of process
in damage actions seems securely established in International Shoe's
minimum-contacts concept. The twenty years since its decision have
been occupied by the pointillist process of locating particular cases
on one side of the line or the other. Some states retain the formality
of local service on the secretary of state, and some courts, still trans-
fixed by Pennoyer's inhibitions on interstate service of process, have
114 Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933).
115 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
"86Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). For no apparent reason, no effort
was made to reconcile this holding with that in the parallel situation in Washing-
ton v. Superior Court, supra note 114.
117See D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 ILL. L. FORum 533.
118 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see text supra, at note 9.
E1965
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thought this important." With these qualifications and aberrations,
the rule now amounts to this: a state can subject a person to its
jurisdiction by service of process anywhere in the country, so long
as the litigation has substantial local elements. What remains of the
aspect of Pennoyer that precluded extraterritorial service is difficult
to see, although some authorities with more tenacity than persuasive-
ness still profess the new rule to be only a qualification of the old.
The second problem in the Pennoyer system was the matter of
notice in in rem proceedings. Not long after Pennoyer was de-
cided, it was held that due process required no more than seizure
or an equivalent manifestation of jurisdictional initiative. Accord-
ingly, upon seizure or its equivalent it was unnecessary to make
other efforts to give notice of the proceedings to persons con-
cernedY.20 The rule was applied in condemnation and statutory
quiet-tide proceedings,' 2' and a number of cases involved statutory
proceedings for the forfeiture of abandoned property. 2 In one
context and another there was unshaken adherence to the rule that
a court had jurisdiction if the "thing" was seized and that it was
up to the absentee to find out about the proceedings. This attitude
was strengthened by the fact that no provision for notice could
have been required consistent with Pennoyer, for this might have
called for extraterritorial service of process.
The decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 23
abruptly intruded on this aspect of Pennoyer v. Neff. That case
involved a New York statutory procedure for the settling of a trus-
tee's accounts concerning common trust funds held in its custody.
The procedure was substantially identical to accountings for ordi-
nary trustees, executors, and administrators, and resulted in a decree
approving the accounts and exonerating the trustee from claims of
liability in connection with the trust. It clears the trust corpus and
it also clears the trustee, a kind of declaratory judgment certifying
the rectitude of the trustee's conduct.
The question in Mullane was whether the proceedings were con-
"19 See, e.g., Bond v. Golden, 273 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1959).
120 See, e.g., Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907).
121 See Huling v. Kaw Valley R.R., 130 U.S. 559 (1889) (condemnation); Arndt
v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890) (statutory quiet-title suit).
122 See, e.g., Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 US. 282 (1923).
123 339 US. 306 (1950).
HeinOnline -- 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275 1965
276 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
clusive on beneficiaries of the trust who had not been served or
otherwise notified of the proceedings. It was argued in support of
the statute that the proceeding concerned a trust res, that the pro-
ceeding was therefore in rem, and that the beneficiaries were ac-
cordingly bound regardless of notice. Per contra it was argued that
the proceedings concerned the personal obligation of the trustee
to the beneficiaries, that the proceeding was therefore in personam,
and that service of notice was necessary before the benficiaries could
be concluded.
It was held that a reasonable effort to give actual notice to the
beneficiaries had to be made, at least to the extent of mailing notice
to the beneficiaries whose addresses were known. The Court ac-
knowledged that a balance had to be struck between giving notice
to parties interested and providing a device for winding up trustee
accounts, and observed that it had "not committed itself to any
formula achieving a balance between these interests in a particular
proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be uti-
lized or what test it must meet."'2 4 And the Court intimated that
the old Pennoyer formula retained little decisional power:
125
Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been
sometimes termed in rem, or more vaguely still, "in the nature
of proceeding in rem." . .. But in any event we think that
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment... do not
depend upon a classification for which the standards are so
elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily
for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to state.
Not long afterward, in Walker v. City of Hutchinson,126 a con-
demnation proceeding which the state court had faithfully charac-
terized as in rem, 27 the judgment was set aside because the prop-
erty owner had been given notice of the valuation hearing only by
publication. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., said
the Court, "establishes the rule that, if feasible, notice must be
reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may
directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests."'
28
124 Id. at 314. 125 Id. at 312.
126 352 U.S. 112 (1956). See also New York v. N.Y., N.H., & H. R.R., 344 U.S.
293 (1953).
127 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 178 Kan. 263, 267 (1955).
128 352 U.S. at 115.
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The rule was applied more recently in Schroeder v. City of New
York .
2 9
It is surely not reading too much into these cases to say that the
Supreme Court will hold that no proceeding concludes a person
who can be identified and located with reasonable effort unless that
person is notified of the proceeding by means no less dignified than
regular mail. In practical context this amounts to a requirement of
service of process on all persons except those who have disappeared
for some time or are deliberately hiding. The vast stores of infor-
mation about people that are readily available in our bureaucratized
society make it hard to lose someone-the post office, telephone
companies, utilities, and credit bureaus usually know or can find
them. In historical perspective, transmittal of process by the modern
post office is at least as trustworthy as it was by the eighteenth-
century sheriff; in comparative perspective, it may be recalled that
European civil process is routinely delivered by mail.130 As to the
absconders, there may still be some utility in the idea of service
by publication, although it seems to me there are more attractive
ways of meeting that problem.3'8
When the rule is made clear, as there is every indication it will
be, that service of notice is a general requirement, the presence of
property in the jurisdiction loses the vestiges of its special jurisdic-
tional significance. Process, delivered either by the sheriff or by the
postman, must issue whether the property is real or personal,
whether it is seized or not, and whether the interested parties are
found locally or elsewhere. The property-the land, the trust fund,
the bank account-no longer has significance as a "thing" over
which the court has jurisdiction, but is merely an event that is the
proper occasion for exercise of local jurisdiction, like an automo-
bile accident or a claim for attorney's fees.'3 2 I think we have now
about reached this stage. That being so, there is nothing left by
which to differentiate proceedings in personam and those in rem,
and the keystone of Pennoyer's conceptual structure is gone.
The Pennoyer conceptual structure has indeed long since proved
inadequate to hold the problem cases in predictable and useful
129 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
130 See EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 14, at 92.
131 See text following note 161 infra.
132 Cf. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
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relationship to each other, which is what a conceptual system is for.
Something has already been said on this point,13 and the critical
observations of Mr. Justice Jackson have already been noted. 34 But
the difficulties appeared without being recognized many years ago
in two cases that since have become landmarks, Harris v. Balk
135
and New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy.136 A few words
about them may be appropriate to drive home the weaknesses of
the Pennoyer system.
Harris v. Balk was a garnishment proceeding in Maryland
brought by one Epstein to collect a sum allegedly due him from
Balk, who lived in North Carolina. The garnishee was Harris, who
concededly owed Balk $180. Harris also resided in North Carolina
and was passing through Baltimore when Epstein happened-so far
as the record shows-to catch him with a writ of attachment gar-
nishing his debt to Balk. Balk, having no notice of the proceeding,
defaulted and Harris pursuant to the judgment paid the money over
to Epstein. Balk later sued Harris in North Carolina to recover the
$180, the defense being the prior payment pursuant to the Maryland
garnishment.
Balk argued that the Maryland court had no jurisdiction because
the debt was not "in" Maryland, where Harris had been only
casually and temporarily, but rather was "in" North Carolina where
Harris permanently resided. On the other side, it was argued that
Harris himself while in Maryland was personally subject to Mary-
land's jurisdiction. The Court was thus confronted with competing
conceptualizations of the situation, each manifesting fidelity to the
facts and each plausible within the Pennoyer scheme.
This was not, let it be emphasized, a "borderline" situation in
the sense that it was a case lying uncertainly close to a conceptual
boundary line. On the contrary, the situation was a dual occupant
of two conceptual categories that purported to be mutually exclu-
sive. Selection of the "proper" category in such a situation is lit-
erally arbitrary, because the conceptual system by its very terms
does not recognize that a choice is necessary and therefore provides
no tools of analysis by which the choice can be made.
On the other hand, plausible argument could be advanced in
terms of the Pennoyer system that the debt could be garnished in
133 See text supra, at notes 90-94. 135 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
134 .Se text supra, at note 125. 136 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
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neither Maryland nor North Carolina. It could not be garnished
in North Carolina, so it could be said, because Harris was out of
the state, and therefore beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdic-
tion, and therefore not amenable to North Carolina garnishment
process. At the same time, it could not be garnished in Maryland
because garnishment procedure contemplates that "the plaintiff [i.e.,
Epstein] is really, in such a proceeding, a representative of the cred-
itor of the garnishee [i.e., Balk], and therefore if such creditor him-
self [Balk] had the right to commence suit to recover the debt...
his representative has the same right... .,,1 To recognize Epstein
as a plaintiff is therefore to constitute him Balk's representative for
the occasion. But the appointment of a personal representative em-
powered to manage and consume the principal's property is tanta-
mount to the direct exercise of authority and jurisdiction over the
principal himself. Since Balk, the principal, was not within the juris-
diction of the Maryland court, so it could be argued under Pen-
voyer, the Maryland proceedings were void.
In the line of analysis just suggested, the situation in Harris v.
Balk would lie wholly outside the Pennoyer system, a conceptual
system that purports to be inclusive, and would be one in which no
court could enter a valid judgment. This analysis need not be ac-
cepted, of course. The key points are that it is as plausible as the
one the Court did adopt and that it cannot be rejected by any argu-
ment derived from Pennoyer itself.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy presented the same difficulty.
In that case a man named Gould had a paid-up insurance policy that
had become due. Gould had a daughter, Mrs. Dunlevy, to whom
the policy allegedly had been assigned. A creditor of Mrs. Dunlevy
brought garnishment proceedings in Pennsylvania against the insur-
ance company, seeking to reach the policy proceeds and joining
Gould as an additional party. The company admitted the sum was
due, alleged that Gould claimed the policy proceeds, paid the
money into court, and requested that Mrs. Dunlevy and Gould be
interpleaded. Mrs. Dunlevy defaulted, judgment was entered in
favor of Gould, and the money was paid to him. Mrs. Dunlevy in
the meantime moved to California, sued the insurance company
there on the policy, and recovered judgment. The company pleaded
that the Pennsylvania proceeding determined the interests of Gould
and Mrs. Dunlevy in the fund, but this defense was rejected.
137 198 U.S. at 226.
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The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the interpleader pro-
ceeding "was an attempt to bring about a final and conclusive ad-
judication of her personal rights, not merely to discover property
and apply it to debts.... The established general rule is that any
personal judgment a state court may render against one who ...
is not... served with process in its borders.., is void, because the
court had no jurisdiction over his person."'138 This was assuredly
an analysis permitted by Pennoyer's rules. It is not clear, however,
why the analysis would not have been equally applicable in Harris
v. Balk: That proceeding did not merely "discover" Banc's property
in Maryland and "apply it to debts"; the Maryland proceeding
determined in Balk's absence that he owed a debt to Epstein and it
is impossible to see why that was not "an attempt to bring about
a final and conclusive adjudication of [Balk's] personal rights" to
the extent of $180.'s9
On the other hand, the interpleader suit in Dunlevy just as easily
could have been analyzed as a proceeding to determine the interests
in a specific res, i.e., the insurance proceeds. That "thing" was with-
in the territory of Pennsylvania, because the debtor-insurance com-
pany was there, and the fund had been taken into the custody by
its officials.' 4" The adjudication of the conflicting claims to the fund
would be in substance a quiet-tide proceeding, which under Pen-
noyer could be held-and held only?-in the state where the "thing"
was located. 4'
18 241 U.S. at 521, 522-23.
130 The fact that Balks liability to Epstein in excess of $180 was left open by
the Maryland judgment does not vitiate the fact that his liability was conclusively
determined up to that amount. If the amount Harris owed Balk had been, say,
$500, and the amount claimed by Epstein was only $300 (as it was in fact), the
garnisment judgment would have determined Balk's "personal rights" as exhaus-
tively as an in personam judgment. The piecemeal character of the adjudication
could not have altered the character of Balk's legal relationship to Harris.
140A year later, the Court so characterized a bank account in a sequestration
proceeding: "Indebtedness due from a resident to a non-resident ... is property
within the state. .. . The only essentials to the exercise of the state's power are
presence of the res within its borders, its seizure at the commencement of the
proceedings, and the opportunity of the owner to be heard." Pennington v. Fourth
National Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271, 272 (1917).
141 See Arndt v. Griggs, supra note 121. The recent decision in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), I think has the effect of re-
pudiating the Dunlevy decision. The Western Union case was a suit in Pennsyl-
vania by the state to escheat sums held by the telegraph company representing
unclaimed money orders. Pennsylvania claimed the amounts of money orders
[1965
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The Pennoyer system, in addition to its other defects, is thus a
revolving door as applied in quasi in rem situations; where you come
out in analyzing the jurisdictional problem depends on where you
decide to stop. Its inadequacy as a general theory can be summarized
as follows: whereas an object is "property" because people have
legal claims to it, and any legal claim for material redress is a claim
to be compensated in property, Pennoyer requires the impossibility
of thinking of property without an owner and compensation with-
out payment.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW THEORY
Ever since International Shoe, Pennoyer v. Neff has been
eligible for oblivion. Chief Justice Traynor plainly suggested that
the step be taken, and that all jurisdictional problems be approached
as ones of the existence of minimum contacts between the forum and
the transaction in litigation.142 Surely this is not difficult to conceive
in the present posture of the law.
1. The "long-arm" statutes are settling into familiar application in
multistate tort and contract cases. If drafted to embrace multiparty
litigation-disastrous accidents, claims for impleader in manufac-
turer's liability cases, and the like-they would close a gap that has
long existed in the remedial system of the United States. 43 It seems
bought in that state but not collected by the senders, wherever they might have
been. The state of New York claimed the same funds on the ground they were
"in" New York, the company's corporate domicile and principal headquarters.
Other states made similar claims, along the lines of those in Texas v. New Jersey,
see text supra, at note 13. The Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania could not
proceed against the company in a suit in which New York was not a party, be-
cause a person in the defendant's situation "is deprived of due process of law if he
is compelled to relinquish [the property] without assurance that he will not be
held liable again in another jurisdiction or in a suit brought by a claimant who is
not bound by the first judgment." 368 U.S. at 75. Although the Court limited its
discussion to cases where jurisdiction was asserted in rem and perhaps to escheat
cases, it is difficult to see why the same principle would not be held applicable in
a situation like Dunlevy, especially since International Shoe and Mullane have re-
moved any obstacles to giving notice to the absent claimants.
In the Western Union case, an original proceeding in the Supreme Court was
necessary because the rival claimants were states and not amenable to the process of
courts of other states. That is no barrier where the claimants are individuals or
corporations. See generally LouisEi. & HAZARD, Op. cit. supra note 18, at 429-31.
142 Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338 (1957).
143 See AxmrcA LAw INsTTrrET, STuDy OF THE DIVIsION OF JTURIsDICrloX BETWEEN
SraE AND F nraAL CouRTs, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, pp. 119 et seq. (1965).
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clear that legislation along these lines would be sustained by Interna-
tional Shoe as buttressed by Mullane.144 This would supply the juris-
dictional basis for the damage actions that are the general run of liti-
gation.
2. The presence of a res-a tract of land, a fund-is of no peculiar
jurisdictional significance but is rather the transactional event that
provides a legitimate basis for plenary jurisdiction pursuant to the
minimum-contacts rule. The process is issued to nonresidents in such
cases in order to comply with Mullane's notice requirement. That
process, because it issues from a state having minimum contacts with
the litigated transaction, has potency in virtue of International Shoe
to permit entry of whatever judgment is necessary to determine the
controversy, without regard to limitations formerly associated with
in rem proceedings.'
4 5
3. The attachment cases are appropriately limited by the mini-
mum-contacts rule to situations where either the obligation secured
by the attachment arose from a transaction with local elements, 14 in
which case there is plenary jurisdiction because of minimum con-
tacts anyway, or where the plaintiff can show that attachment is
probably necessary if he is to realize on his claim, 47 in which case
attachment is employed for its proper use as a security device. Since
these two categories include practically all the cases where attach-
ment is presently employed, only minor practical change will result
from this revised conceptualization. Serious inconvenience regard-
ing the place of trial occasioned by attachment as a security device
can be avoided or mitigated by dismissal conditioned upon a bond
1 44 In Mullane, Justice Jackson had said that "the vital interest of the State in
bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served only if
interests or claims of individuals who are outside the State can somehow be de-
termined." 339 U.S. at 313. There is no reason to believe that a state's legitimate
concern with cleaning up complicated situations is restricted to trust administration.
145 Cf. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
146 Cf. Tingley v. Bateman, 10 Mass. 344 (1813), supra note 72, refusing to allow
garnishment of a transient obligor, the same situation as in Harris v. Balk.
147 It seems not farfetched to see this interest as one that any state may enforce
in the interest of all the states taken togeher. Maintenance of a state-court system
of remedial justice that is actually effective is a legitimate objective to which each
state may pro tanto make contribution. Cf. Carrington, The Modern Utility of
Quasi in Rem jurisdiction, 76 HIAv. L. REv. 303 (1962).
E1965
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being posted by defendant to meet judgment liability should it ulti-
mately be established. 4 '
In this scheme of things, there are two defects that inhibit ac-
ceptance of a general minimum-contacts theory of jurisdiction. The
first is that the vagueness of the minimum-contacts general principle
can make jurisdictional litigation uncertain at the trial level and fre-
quent at the appellate level. The second is that it provides no solu-
tion to the problem of the claimant who cannot be located or identi-
fied-he being among those constituting "all the world" that were
concluded by in rem proceedings.
The first defect can be resolved by the technique of particulariza-
tion-arbitrary particularization if you will-within the general mini-
mum-contacts framework. 149 This technique is manifested legisla-
tively in the "long-arm" statutes, though they could be greatly im-
proved upon. 10 It is also manifested judicially in the two recent
cases which are the pretext for this essay.
In Texas v. New Jersey, 5' Mr. Justice Black considered the pros-
pect of applying the general minimum-contacts principle to numer-
ous and various state escheat claims, and found it unmanageable:
52
The "contacts" test as applied in this field is not really a work-
able test at all-it is simply a phrase suggesting that this Court
should examine the circumstances surrounding each particu-
lar item of escheatable property on its own peculiar facts and
then try to make a difficult, often quite subjective, decision
as to which State's claim to those pennies or dollars seems
stronger than another's.
He then announced a series of specific rules: escheat of debts
owed to persons for whom a last address is known shall be to the
state where that address is located; escheat of debts owed to persons
for whom there is no record of address shall be to the state of the
debtor's corporate domicile; and a variation was announced to cover
14s Cf. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339. US. 684
(1950).
149 It seems infinitely preferable to have a sensible general theory with arbitrary
categorial subsystems than, as in the Pennoyer system, an unsensible general sys-
tem with arbitrary categorial subsystems. In the former situation, the subsystems
can be criticized and corrected intelligently and without using fictions.
150 Cf. EMENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 14, at 117-18.
151 379 U.S. 674 (1965). 152 1d. at 679.
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cases where a particular state had no escheat law. What is interesting
is not the particular rules themselves but their particularity. 1 3 A
similar technique could reduce the minimum-contacts principle to
like particularity in identified needful areas of jurisdictional law.5 4
The other case manifesting a useful technique of particularization
is the Citibank case. 55 That case involved issues far afield of the
jurisdiction of state courts, but the manner in which the Supreme
Court cautiously handled the question of remedy is relevant to the
present discussion. The government had brought suit in the South-
ern District of New York to recover income taxes allegedly due
from Omar, S. A., a Uruguayan corporation, and joined the First
National City Bank as a party. On a showing that Omar was liqui-
dating and withdrawing its assets from the United States, the gov-
ernment obtained a temporary injunction restraining the bank from
dispersing Omar's account maintained at the bank's Montevideo
branch. The bank appealed the temporary injunction and won re-
versal in the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court in turn reversed,
reinstating the injunction.
The Government summarized its main point in this way:"""
The District Court had authority to enjoin respondent,
over whom it had personal jurisdiction, from participating
in the dissipation of assets belonging to an absent taxpayer
pending the service of valid process on the taxpayer.
The bank argued in more traditional terms:
57
Accounts maintained on the books of foreign branches of
American banks are contractual obligations created by, exist-
ing under, and performable in accordance with, foreign law.
They constitute property or property rights within the for-
153 Mr. Justice Black observed: "We realize that this case could have been re-
solved otherwise, for the issue here is not controlled by statutory or constitutional
provisions or by past decisions, nor is it entirely one of logic. It is fundamentally a
question of ease of administration and equity." 379 US. at 683.
154The whole scheme of "divisible divorce," allowing Nevada to divorce New
Yorkers but reserving to New York the chief authority to determine post-divorce
property arrangements, can usefully be regarded as a scheme of particularized ju-
risdictional rules that is not "entirely one of logic" but "fundamentally a question
of ease of administration and equity." Cf. note 153 supra. There appears to be no
more coherent way of looking at it. Cf. EmENzwiG, op. cit. supra note 14, at 265
et seq.
155 United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
156 Brief for Petitioner, p. 10. 157Brief for Respondent, p. 6.
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eign country which permits the branch to operate. Courts
in the United States have no jurisdiction in rem or quasi in
rem over such accounts.
It is pertinent to observe that the Government limited the case it
made to the case at hand: temporary relief against dissipation of the
assets of a taxpayer pending service of process against him. It did not
rest on the broader ground that the account was "in" New York for
the purposes of any type of litigation-a commercial claim by the
Government, for example-nor that it was "in" New York for all
purposes of the present proceeding.
The decision of the Supreme Court was no broader: 11
If it were clear that the debtor (Omar) were beyond reach
of the District Court so far as personal service is concerned,
we would have quite a different case-one on which we inti-
mate no opinion....
Whether the Montevideo branch is a "separate entity," as
the Court of Appeals thought, is not germane to the present
narrow issue. It is not a separate entity in the sense that it is
insulated from respondent's managerial prerogatives.... This
is not to say that a federal court in this country should treat
all the affairs of a branch bank the same as it would those
of a home office.
This disposition reflects the approach suggested for analyzing the
jurisdictional basis of foreign-attachment proceedings. Jurisdiction
to attach or sequester is appropriate where there are minimum con-
tacts with the transaction being litigated, or to employ attachment
or sequestration as a security device when eventual collection is
shown to be jeopardized.'8 9 It is noteworthy in this connection that
in Citibank the government proposed to serve process on the de-
fendant Omar under the terms of the New York "long-arm" statute
permitting service on a non-domiciliary who "transacts any business
in this state."' 60 Moreover, there was a clear implication that juris-
diction to secure the assets does not require presupposition of juris-
diction to determine the merits: "If it were clear that the debtor
(Omar) were beyond reach of [process] ... we would have quite a
different case."'' It is not difficult to take the next step that if the
defendant provides security in lieu of the assets, then assertion of
158 379 U.S. at 381, 384.
109 See text supra, at notes 146-48.
160 See 379 U.S. at 381. 161 Id. at 381.
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jurisdiction to decide the merits would be improper in the absence
of minimum contacts with the transaction sued on.'
62
This analysis accommodates the attachment cases within the struc-
ture of the minimum-contacts principle. Damage actions, specific
performance suits, condemnation, and interpleader types of cases
have already been accommodated. This brings us to the problem
of the persons who cannot be located or identified.
There are differences between the problem of the person who can
be identified but not located and that of the person who cannot even
be identified. The person who can be identified though not located
has two characteristics that are different from the one who is un-
identified. First, the problem of notifying him turns on the degree of
effort that must be expended in seeking him. Second, he is a person
against whom it may be practical to obtain a compensatory judg-
ment. On the other hand, the unidentified person-"unknown heirs"
are the prototype-may be nonexistent, so that efforts to find him
will necessarily prove futile. Moreover, the unidentified person is
never in practical terms the target of a compensatory claim because
it is impossible to identify "his" property and thus to realize redress.
As to him, the only litigating objective can be to foreclose claims he
may have against others.
With these differences in mind, it is not difficult to put the identi-
fied but unlocated person into place in the minimum-contacts
framework. The limiting case here would be where, in an action for
damages or other compensatory relief, reasonable effort is made to
deliver notice but notice is in fact not delivered to the defendant.
Can a valid judgment for compensatory relief be granted in such a
case? This depends on whether the condition of rendering a valid
judgment under the Due Process Clause is defined as the giving of
notice or the making a reasonable effort to give notice. If the former,
then the plaintiff is helpless to obtain compensation-for example,
from the defendant's insurance company-unless he can actually de-
liver notice to the defendant. The Supreme Court has never gone
beyond holding that due process requires a reasonable opportunity
to be heard and that reasonable effort to give notice of the hearing
sufficiently affords that opportunity. But the Supreme Court has
never passed on the precise question raised, although many lower
courts have. The problem has arisen recurrently under the automo-
162 See note 148 supra.
[1965
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bile "long-arm" statutes. Most courts have ducked the issue by read-
hag-sometimes by straining to read-the local state statute to require
actual notice.13 Those courts that have faced the issue all appear to
have held that failure of actual delivery of notice does not preclude
valid judgment, so long as a reasonable and technically punctilious
effort has been made, i.e., there has been compliance with a statutory
procedure that is itself reasonable.6 4 And this seems a correct anal-
ysis of the due process requirement as established by the Supreme
Court.
This brings us to the last stage of the analysis, the problem of the
person who cannot be identified. By hypothesis such a person can-
not be given notice of the proceedings despite reasonable efforts to
identify and locate him within the state and without. Yet there are
necessities that require proceedings that can close the door con-
clusively on all future disputation. "Parties cannot thus, by their
seclusion from the means of information, claim exemption from the
laws that control human affairs, and set up a right to open up all the
transactions of the past. The world must move on .... ,1165 The trust
accounting in Mullane was such a case, decedents' estates are such
cases, and so are bankruptcy, quiet-tide, and many other proceed-
ings conventionally denominated in rem proceedings.
The traditional device of foreclosing the absentee is notice by
publication. Indeed, achievement of the objective of finality is the
only real justification for service by publication, and the tradition
and the need no doubt will keep the ceremony of service by publi-
cation a part of the law of jurisdiction. But determination of the un-
identifiable absentee's interest can be rested on ground more secure
in concept and policy.
The more appropriate approach, it seems to me, is the notion of
bar by statute of limitation. This notion has pervaded the law of
jurisdiction to an extent perhaps not fully appreciated. The fact is
that the prototype foreign attachment proceeding, that of the Lord
Mayor's Court of London, was not conclusive on the absentee
103 See, e.g., Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 35 Del. 304 (1932); Muncie v. West-
craft Corp., 58 Wash.2d 36 (1961); Emery Transport Co. v. Baker, 119 N.W.2d
272 (Iowa 1963).
164 E.g., Morris v. Argo-Collier Truck Lines, 39 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Ky. 1941);
Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191 (ED. Va. 1947); Iendershot v. Ferkel, 144
Ohio St. 112 (1944).
165 Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 519 (1874).
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debtor until the expiration of a year and a day after judgment. °0
The same was true also of the Maryland statute in Harris v. Balk.1 7
Most probate statutes fix a period for claims,'618 and so do the bank-
ruptcy laws.169 Escheat and abandoned property forfeitures are
predicated on the bar of time, as are many statutory quiet-tide pro-
cedures. Many procedures that are not explicitly founded on the
principle of limitation are nevertheless consonant with it-"abscond-
ing debtors" and "unknown heirs," the typical personages, do not
become such overnight.
On this analysis, the problem of serving notice on unknown ab-
sentee disappears. The claims of those who cannot be found are
concluded instead by an official signal-such as the commencement
of proceedings-that time is running, and the imposition of bar when
it has done so. The limiting case would be that of an absentee who
ultimately proved to have been an incompetent: Could the bar of
time validly be raised to his claims? The Supreme Court has indi-
cated it can,170 and there is no reason to suppose a retreat from this
view. That being so, the minimum-contacts principle, particularized
in needful special areas, attended by a notice requirement, and sup-
plemented by systems of time bar, provides an adequate general
theory of state-court jurisdiction. We can release Pennoyer's grip on
our minds.
166 See Locke, op. cit. supra note 21, at 19.
167 See 198 U.S. at 227.
168 Cf. Stevens v. Torregano, 192 Ca. App.2d 105 (1961).
1 6 9 See MAcLAcaHAN, BrANtuKrcy 142 (1956).
170 Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1882).
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